Author Archives: Holger Funke

GSMA published requirements for SAM

The GSM Association (GSMA) has released a new requirement specification focusing on Secured Applications for Mobile (SAM). In this specification the capability allowing cellular connected devices (e.g. smartphones) to use a wide range of secured applets within an eUICC (embedded universal integrated circuit card) is described. Applets specified here can be managed by a service provider and are cooperating with applications running in the device itself. The focus of the specification is on the eUICC where the secured applets will operate independently and outside of any eUICC profile.

GSMA Logo

The requirement specification with the title SAM.01 is published on the GSMA website in the following link: https://www.gsma.com/newsroom/resources/sam-01-secured-applications-for-mobile-requirements

Use case: mobile eID as a secured applications for mobile

The usage of mobile devices for mobile services is one of the dominant trends we can see worldwide. Mobile devices replace the personal computer at home or at office. For access to online services the mobile device is getting more and more important. New applications are often only offered for mobile devices (mobile first). Based on this trend the mobile device is becoming the most common interface between the customer and the service providers.

For the digitalization of business process, the secure identification and authentication of end customers is a key requirement. The eIDAS regulation No 910/2014 of the EU is defining three levels of assurance (LoA) for electronic identification. The two highest levels “high” and “substantial” are demanding the usage of secure elements (see BSI Technical Guideline TR-03159 Mobile Identities). To achieve these levels the usage of an secure hardware token is essential. One of these token could be an eUICC and the usage is specified in SAM.

This secure hardware token is a central element for several mobile identities that are currently under development, like ICAO Digital Travel Credentials (DTC), mobile Driving License (mDL) specified in ISO/IEC 18013-5 or in general building blocks for mobile ID (ISO/IEC 23220). Last but not least the German identity card (ePA) will be derived to a smartphone to use the online identification directly on the device.

You can find a description of current mobile ID projects and standardisation work in my article “Digital and mobile identities” which was published in the context of Open Identity Summit 2020.

As soon as the eUICC is a well-specified secure platform, it is the perfect platform for hosting mobile ID applications which are offering high security for the service provider and also for the end user.

Architecture of SAM

The following figure describes the architecture of Secured Applications for Mobile (SAM) as specified by GSMA:

Architecture of Secured Applications for Mobile (SAM)
Architecture of Secured Applications for Mobile (SAM) (Source: GSMA SAM.01 v1.0)

On the left side you can find the service manager (SAM SM), which acts on behalf of the Application Service Provider (ASP) and is in charge of managing SAM Applets through SAM Commands. On the device itself you can see the device application (e.g. provided in an app store by the ASP), the local applet assistant (LAA) and – of course – the eUICC. The eUICC offers a security domain (SAM SD, also known as common security domain (CSD)) including an ASP SD where the SAM applets are located. The SAM applet can be used to assure the security of the device application by storing keys or holder data, performing encryption, signing etc.

Next steps

The work has not finished with the release of the requirement specification. All the requirements must be incorporated into a technical specification where all details are described on the level of bits and bytes. To assure that current developments in other working groups are also involved (and to assure that the wheel is not reinvented a second time) GSMA is working with external organizations like GlobalPlatform or ETSI. On this way we will see several interoperable applets running on eUICC allowing high security in the near future.

TR-03105 Part 3.2 V1.5.1 or How I met your master file

A few days ago German BSI has released a maintenance release of TR-03105 Part 3.2. Primarily, the new version 1.5.1 includes editorial changes. Tests of this specification are focusing on eMRTD and the data groups and protocols used there.

What’s new in TR-03105 Part 3.2 Version 1.5.1?

  • Reference documentation: Re-arranged documents of the same type are now in direct neighbourhood to make them easier to find
  • Reference documentation: Added ICAO Doc9303 Part 9 and ICAO Doc9303 Part 12
  • Added a new profile “Master File” for eMRTD supporting a Master File as root directory
  • Unit ISO7816_J: Clarification, that all test cases of this test unit which require the “Open ePassport Application” procedure must be performed twice (one test run with BAC and one with PACE) if the chip supports both protocols. If the chip only supports one of these protocols (BAC or PACE), only one test run has to be performed with the supported protocol used in the “Open ePassport Application” procedure
  • Test case ISO7816_J_12: Clarification in expected result (step 1)
  • Test case ISO7816_L_13: Added new profile “MF”
  • Test case ISO7816_L_14: Clarification in purpose
  • Test case ISO7816_L_15: Clarification in purpose
  • Test case ISO7816_L_16: Clarification in purpose
  • Some minor editorial changes

The one and only technical change in this version is test case ISO7816_L_13 where the new specified profile “MF” is added. This profile assures that this test case is only performed if the chip supports a Master File. Why is this profile needed? In the field there are several eMRTD without a MF. In case of PACE you need a MF to store files like EF.CadAccess or EF.ATR/INFO. But in the case of BAC a MF is not necessary. In clause 4 of ICAO Doc9303 Part 9 (7th edition) you can find the information “An optional master file (MF) may be the root of the file system” and further on “The need for a master file is determined by the choice of operating systems and optional access conditions”.

Characteristics of smart card file systems

All information of an eMRTD is stored in a file system defined in ISO 7816-4. A usual file system is organized hierarchically into dedicated files (DFs) and elementary files (EFs). Dedicated files can contain elementary files or other dedicated files. Applications are special variants of dedicated files (Application DF) and have to be selected by their DF name indicating the application identifier (AID). After the selection of an application, the file within this application can be accessed. On this way a smart card file system has a typical tree structure, as described in the following figure:

Example for smart card file structure (Source ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013
Example for smart card file structure (Source ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013)

Additionally, ICAO Doc 9303 describes in part 10 another sample file strucure with focus on eMRTD. Also in this case the master file is the root of the file system and all aditional files or applications are nodes or leafs of the tree For instance, following figure visuals a sample eMRTD file system including a master file:

Example for eMRTD file system (Source: ICAO Doc 9303 , Part 10 (7th edition, 2015)
Example for eMRTD file system (Source: ICAO Doc 9303 , Part 10 (7th edition, 2015)

Likewise, the eMRTD Application in the figure is the Application DF mentioned above in the ISO 7816 file structure. Both EF and DF can be selected with the APDU called SELECT. Compared to an EF, that is selected with the command ’00 A4 02 0C <Lc> <FID>’, an application is selected by the following APDU: ’00 A4 04 0C <Lc> <AID>’ (where <Lc> length of command, <FID> means File ID and <AID> means Application ID. The difference is in parameter P1 of the APDU: 04 indicates a ‘Select by DF name’ and 02 indicates a ‘Select EF under the current DF’.

Characteristics of a Master File

You can address the master file in almost the same manner as a EF or DF. A master file has s special file identifier, which is reserved only for master files: ‘3F 00′. This FID can be used to select the MF. Therefore ISO 7816 specifies the APDU ’00 A4 00 0C 02 3F 00′ to select the MF. On the other hand ICAO Doc 9303 part 10 (clause 3.9.1.1) specifies an alternative APDU to select MF: ’00 A4 00 0C’. In short: both commands are valid and select the MF. Beyond that, Doc 9303 recommends in the same clause in a note not to use the SELECT MF command. Why might this APDU cause problems? You can find the answer in ISO 7816 (clause 11.1.1): “If the current DF is neither a descendant of, nor identical to the previously selected DF, then the security status specific to the previously selected DF shall be revoked”. To sum up: changing the directory during Secure Messaging results in closing the secure channel and losing the secure session.

BSI released version 1.2 of TR-03105 Part 3.3

The German BSI has released a new version 1.2 of TR-03105 Part 3.3 for eIDAS token. This test specification for chip assures conformity and interoperability of eIDAS token like eID cards or residence permits. TR-03105 Part 3.3 contains tests for protocols that are summarized under EACv2 and corresponding data groups.

Front page of German ID card (Personalauswweis) compliant to TR-03105 Part 3.3
Front page of German ID card (Source: Wikipedia)

In TR-03105 Part 3.3 Version 1.2 new test cases are added to verify and assure the correct handling of authorization extensions. Authorization extensions are specified in TR-03110 and they are a special type of certificate extensions. These extensions convey authorizations additional to those in the Certificate Holder Authorization Template (CHAT) contained in the certificate. Additionally, authorization extensions contain exactly one discretionary data object that encodes the relative authorization. The main changes of version 1.2 are:

  • Test cases to verify correct handling of authorization extensions
  • New certificates to perform test cases with authorization extensions
  • The tests for command COMAPRE can now be performed in a more detailed way (see new table in ICS in annex A.1)
  • A new test case to verify the TA migration according to the manufacturer’s implementation conformance statement where the AT trust point are replaced
  • Some minor editorial changes and clarifications

Modified test cases in version 1.2

  • EAC2_7816_L_36: Clarification in Purpose
  • EAC2_7816_N_1: Clarification in purpose
  • EAC2_7816_P_8: Added missing tag ‘7C’ in commands
  • EAC2_ISO7816_P9: Removed tag ‘97’ that is not necessary in command RESET RETRY COUNTER (step 6)
  • EAC2_7816_P_14: Added missing tag ‘7C’ in commands
  • EAC2_7816_P_14: Added missing tag ‘7C’ in commands
  • EAC2_7816_U_13: Expected results: Accept also a checking error in step 3 of preconditions
  • EAC2_7816_U_14: Expected results: Accept also a checking error in step 3 of preconditions
  • EAC2_DATA_B_11: Check a whitelist of SecurityInfos (PACEInfo, PACEDomainParameterInfo, PasswordInfo, ChipAuthenticationInfo, ChipAuthenticationDomainParameterInfo, PSAInfo, TerminalAuthenticationInfo, PSMInfo, CardInfo) and ignore PrivilegedTerminalInfos
  • EAC2_DATA_C_12: Editorial correction in Test-ID
  • EAC2_EIDDATA_B_6: Renamed data type ArtisticName by NomDePlume according to TR-03110

New test cases in version 1.2

  • EAC2_7816_L_38: Positive test with a valid terminal authentication process. The DV certificate and the terminal certificate grant access to an eID access function that is reserved for future use (RFU).
  • EAC2_7816_L_39: Positive test with a valid terminal authentication process. The DV certificate and the terminal certificate grant access to an eID special function that is reserved for future use (RFU).
  • EAC2_7816_L_40: Positive test with a valid terminal authentication process. The DV certificate and the terminal certificate contain a certificate extension (authentication terminals) extended by two empty bytes. The authorization extension in both certificates are extended with leading ‘00 00’ (56 bit instead of 40 bit).
  • EAC2_7816_L_41: Positive test with a valid terminal authentication process. The DV certificate and the terminal certificate contain a certificate extension (eID functions) extended by two empty bytes.
  • EAC2_7816_L_42: Positive test with a valid terminal authentication process. The DV certificate and the terminal certificate contain a certificate extension (special functions) extended by two empty bytes.
  • EAC2_7816_L_43: Positive test with a valid terminal authentication process. The DV certificate and the terminal certificate contain an unknown OID in CHA.
  • EAC2_7816_L_44: Positive test with a valid terminal authentication process. The DV certificate and the terminal certificate contain an unknown authorization extension OID in for eID access.
  • EAC2_7816_L_45: Positive test with a valid terminal authentication process. The DV certificate and the terminal certificate contain an unknown authorization extension OID in for special functions.
  • EAC2_ISO7816_M_9: Positive test to verify that a link certificate can activate a feature of the eID card. In this test case the right to read DG1 is used to verify that the eID card supports activation of features by link certificates.
  • EAC2_ISO7816_M_10: Positive test to verify that a link certificate can deactivate a feature of the eID card. In this test case the right to read DG1 is used to verify that the eID card supports deactivation of features by link certificates.
  • EAC2_ISO7816_M_11: Positive test to verify that rights are granted by the last link certificate and not a combination of all rights in the whole certificate chain. In this test case the right to read DG1 is used.
  • EAC2_ISO7816_M_12: Positive test to verify that a link certificate can activate a feature of the eID card. In this test case the right to compare DG8 is used to verify that the eID card supports activation of eID Access features by link certificates.
  • EAC2_ISO7816_M_13:  Positive test to verify that a link certificate can deactivate a feature of the eID card. In this test case the right to compare DG8 is used to verify that the eID card supports deactivation of eID Access features by link certificates.
  • EAC2_ISO7816_M_14: Positive test to verify that eID Access rights are granted by the last link certificate and not a combination of all rights in the whole certificate chain. In this test case the right to compare DG8 is used.
  • EAC2_7816_N_2: Positive test case to verify the TA mechanism migration according to the manufacturer’s implementation statement (replacement of the AT trust point)

As mentioned in my previous blog post describing latest version of TR-03105 Part 5.1, I’ve extended the focus of my blog from ePassports towards eID and eIDAS token. You can find a list of current test specifications here.

Version 1.5 of BSI TR-03105 Part 5.1 available

Introduction

The German BSI has released a new version 1.5 of TR-03105 Part 5.1. This technical guideline specifies conformity test cases for inspection system that are used in context of border control.

Cover of TR-03105 Part 5.1 Version 1.5
Cover of TR-03105 Part 5.1 Version 1.5

This new version replaces previous maintenance version 1.41, that was released in 2016. Most changes of the current release are based on comments of BSI, G+D Mobile Security and secunet Scurity Networks. This blog post decribes the changes, that took effect over the last months and were finalizied in version 1.5.

Important changes in version 1.5 of TR-03105 Part 5.1:

  • Several test cases are moved to ICAO Test Specification Part 4 for inspection systems
  • Removed transfer interface: specification deleted and test cases adopted.
  • Added new configuration for default EAC+PACE passport
  • Added new test suite for EF.CardSecurity (test suite LDS_J)
  • Added new test suite for EF.ATR/INFO (test suite LDS_K)
  • Added new test cases to verify trust anchor updates
  • Certificates:
    • Generic encoding of Certificate Holder Reference (CHR)
    • New certificates: DV_Cert_16, IS_Cert_16, CVCA_Link_Cert_16, CVCA_Link_Cert_17
  • New profile ‘DPRCTD-SHA1‘ for deprecated SHA-1 algorithm, including updated reference documents: several test cases require that an inspection system successfully validates any CSCA and DS certificate as well as SOD signed with RSA / DSA / ECDSA and SHA-1. This includes certificates and SOD signed 2019 or later. Doc9303 6th edition allowed for the usage of SHA-1, but Doc9303-12 7th edition (2015) clause 4.4.4 does not allow for the usage of these algorithms any longer: “SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512, are the only permitted hashing algorithms”. There are plenty of eMRTDs with CSCA and DS certificates in circulation that follow the 6th edition and make use of SHA-1, i.e. an inspection system shall still support SHA-1. But the test specification should not explicitly require that an inspection system successfully validates a CSCA certificate, the corresponding DS certificate and the eMRTD’s SOD issued recently (or later during the life-time of the test specification) which are signed with RSA / DSA / ECDSA and SHA-1.
  • Deprecated algorithm SHA-1 is replaced by alternative hash algorithm if applicable:
    • Modified test cases: LDS_H_74, LDS_H_75, LDS_H_76, LDS_H_77, LDS_I_01, LDS_I_02, LDS_I_03
  • Updated list of abbreviations and reference documentation
  • Consistent wording of OID (ICAO guide lines and BSI guide lines)
  • Clarification concerning the usage of PACE (test suite ISO7816_G)
  • Updated and re-organised list of algorithms to be supported by inspection systems (chapter 7)
  • Updated list of abbreviations and reference documentation
  • Minor editorial changes

Moved test cases

  • ISO7816_A_01: moved to ICAO ISO7816_A_01
  • ISO7816_A_02: moved to ICAO ISO7816_A_02
  • ISO7816_A_03: moved to ICAO ISO7816_A_04 
  • ISO7816_B_01: moved to ICAO ISO7816_B_01
  • ISO7816_B_02: moved to ICAO ISO7816_B_02
  • ISO7816_B_03: moved to ICAO ISO7816_B_03
  • ISO7816_B_04: moved to ICAO ISO7816_D_01
  • ISO7816_B_05: moved to ICAO ISO7816_D_02
  • ISO7816_B_06: moved to ICAO ISO7816_D_03
  • ISO7816_B_07: moved to ICAO ISO7816_D_04
  • ISO7816_B_08: moved to ICAO ISO7816_D_05
  • ISO7816_B_09: moved to ICAO ISO7816_D_06
  • ISO7816_B_10: moved to ICAO LDS_D32
  • ISO7816_C_01: moved to ICAO ISO7816_F_01
  • ISO7816_C_02: moved to ICAO ISO7816_F_02    
  • ISO7816_C_03: moved to ICAO ISO7816_F_03
  • ISO7816_C_04: moved to ICAO ISO7816_F_04
  • ISO7816_C_05: moved to ICAO ISO7816_F_05
  • ISO7816_C_06: moved to ICAO ISO7816_F_06
  • ISO7816_C_07: moved to ICAO ISO7816_F_07
  • ISO7816_C_08: moved to ICAO ISO7816_F_08
  • ISO7816_D_01: moved to ICAO ISO7816_G_01
  • ISO7816_D_02: moved to ICAO ISO7816_G_02
  • ISO7816_D_03: moved to ICAO ISO7816_G_03
  • ISO7816_D_04: moved to ICAO ISO7816_G_04
  • ISO7816_D_05: moved to ICAO ISO7816_G_05
  • ISO7816_D_06: moved to ICAO ISO7816_G_06
  • ISO7816_D_07: moved to ICAO ISO7816_G_07
  • ISO7816_D_08: moved to ICAO ISO7816_G_08
  • ISO7816_D_09: moved to ICAO ISO7816_G_09
  • ISO7816_D_10: moved to ICAO ISO7816_G_10
  • ISO7816_D_11: moved to ICAO ISO7816_G_11
  • ISO7816_D_12: moved to ICAO ISO7816_G_12
  • ISO7816_D_13: moved to ICAO ISO7816_G_13
  • ISO7816_D_14: moved to ICAO ISO7816_G_14
  • ISO7816_D_15: moved to ICAO ISO7816_G_15
  • ISO7816_F_01: moved to ICAO ISO7816_E_01
  • ISO7816_F_02: moved to ICAO ISO7816_E_02
  • ISO7816_F_04: moved to ICAO ISO7816_E_03
  • ISO7816_F_05: moved to ICAO ISO7816_E_04
  • ISO7816_F_06: moved to ICAO ISO7816_E_05
  • ISO7816_F_07: moved to ICAO ISO7816_E_06
  • ISO7816_F_08: moved to ICAO ISO7816_E_07
  • ISO7816_F_09: moved to ICAO ISO7816_E_08
  • ISO7816_G_01: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_01
  • ISO7816_G_02: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_02
  • ISO7816_G_03: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_03
  • ISO7816_G_04: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_04
  • ISO7816_G_05: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_05
  • ISO7816_G_06: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_06
  • ISO7816_G_07: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_07
  • ISO7816_G_08: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_08
  • ISO7816_G_09: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_09
  • ISO7816_G_10: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_10
  • ISO7816_G_11: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_11
  • ISO7816_G_12: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_12
  • ISO7816_G_13: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_13
  • ISO7816_G_14: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_14
  • ISO7816_G_15: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_15
  • ISO7816_G_16: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_16
  • ISO7816_G_17: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_17
  • ISO7816_G_18: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_18
  • ISO7816_G_19: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_19
  • ISO7816_G_20: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_20
  • ISO7816_G_21: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_21
  • ISO7816_G_22: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_22
  • ISO7816_G_23: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_23
  • ISO7816_G_24: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_24
  • ISO7816_G_25: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_25
  • ISO7816_G_26: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_26
  • ISO7816_G_27: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_27
  • ISO7816_G_28: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_28
  • ISO7816_G_29: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_29
  • ISO7816_G_30: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_30
  • ISO7816_G_31: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_31
  • ISO7816_G_32: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_32
  • ISO7816_G_33: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_33
  • ISO7816_G_34: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_34
  • ISO7816_G_35: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_35
  • ISO7816_G_38: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_36
  • ISO7816_G_39: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_37
  • ISO7816_G_40: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_38
  • ISO7816_G_41: moved to ICAO ISO7816_C_39
  • LDS_A_01: moved to ICAO LDS_A_01
  • LDS_A_02: moved to ICAO LDS_A_02
  • LDS_A_03: moved to ICAO LDS_A_03
  • LDS_A_04: moved to ICAO LDS_A_04
  • LDS_A_05: moved to ICAO LDS_A_05
  • LDS_A_06: moved to ICAO LDS_A_06
  • LDS_A_07: moved to ICAO LDS_A_07
  • LDS_A_08: moved to ICAO LDS_A_08
  • LDS_A_09: moved to ICAO LDS_A_09
  • LDS_A_10: moved to ICAO LDS_A_10
  • LDS_B_01: moved to ICAO LDS_B_01
  • LDS_B_02: moved to ICAO LDS_B_02
  • LDS_B_03: moved to ICAO LDS_B_03
  • LDS_B_04: moved to ICAO LDS_B_04
  • LDS_B_05: moved to ICAO LDS_B_05
  • LDS_B_06: moved to ICAO LDS_B_06
  • LDS_B_07: moved to ICAO LDS_B_07
  • LDS_B_08: moved to ICAO LDS_B_08
  • LDS_B_09: moved to ICAO LDS_B_09
  • LDS_B_10: moved to ICAO LDS_B_10
  • LDS_B_11: moved to ICAO LDS_B_11
  • LDS_B_12: moved to ICAO LDS_B_12
  • LDS_B_13: moved to ICAO LDS_B_13
  • LDS_B_14: moved to ICAO LDS_B_14
  • LDS_B_15: moved to ICAO LDS_B_15
  • LDS_B_16: moved to ICAO LDS_B_16
  • LDS_B_17: moved to ICAO LDS_B_17
  • LDS_B_18: moved to ICAO LDS_B_18
  • LDS_B_19: moved to ICAO LDS_B_19
  • LDS_B_20: moved to ICAO LDS_B_20
  • LDS_B_21: moved to ICAO LDS_B_21
  • LDS_B_22: moved to ICAO LDS_B_22
  • LDS_B_23: moved to ICAO LDS_B_23
  • LDS_B_24: moved to ICAO LDS_B_24
  • LDS_B_25: moved to ICAO LDS_B_25
  • LDS_B_26: moved to ICAO LDS_B_26
  • LDS_B_27: moved to ICAO LDS_B_27
  • LDS_B_28: moved to ICAO LDS_B_28
  • LDS_C_01: moved to ICAO LDS_C_01
  • LDS_C_02: moved to ICAO LDS_C_02
  • LDS_C_03: moved to ICAO LDS_C_03
  • LDS_C_04: moved to ICAO LDS_C_04
  • LDS_C_05: moved to ICAO LDS_C_05
  • LDS_C_06: moved to ICAO LDS_C_06
  • LDS_C_07: moved to ICAO LDS_C_07
  • LDS_C_08: moved to ICAO LDS_C_08
  • LDS_C_09: moved to ICAO LDS_C_09
  • LDS_C_10: moved to ICAO LDS_C_10
  • LDS_C_11: moved to ICAO LDS_C_11
  • LDS_C_12: moved to ICAO LDS_C_12
  • LDS_C_13: moved to ICAO LDS_C_13
  • LDS_C_14: moved to ICAO LDS_C_14
  • LDS_C_15: moved to ICAO LDS_C_15
  • LDS_C_16: moved to ICAO LDS_C_16
  • LDS_C_17: moved to ICAO LDS_C_17
  • LDS_C_18: moved to ICAO LDS_C_18
  • LDS_C_19: moved to ICAO LDS_C_19
  • LDS_C_20: moved to ICAO LDS_C_20
  • LDS_C_21: moved to ICAO LDS_C_21
  • LDS_C_22: moved to ICAO LDS_C_22
  • LDS_C_23: moved to ICAO LDS_C_23
  • LDS_C_24: moved to ICAO LDS_C_24
  • LDS_C_25: moved to ICAO LDS_C_25
  • LDS_C_26: moved to ICAO LDS_C_26
  • LDS_C_27: moved to ICAO LDS_C_27
  • LDS_C_28: moved to ICAO LDS_C_28
  • LDS_H_17: moved to ICAO LDS_D_02
  • LDS_H_18: moved to ICAO LDS_D_03
  • LDS_H_19: moved to ICAO LDS_D_04
  • LDS_H_20: moved to ICAO LDS_D_05
  • LDS_H_21: moved to ICAO LDS_D_06
  • LDS_H_22: moved to ICAO LDS_D_07
  • LDS_H_23: moved to ICAO LDS_D_08
  • LDS_H_24: moved to ICAO LDS_D_09
  • LDS_H_25: moved to ICAO LDS_D_10
  • LDS_H_26: moved to ICAO LDS_D_11
  • LDS_H_27: moved to ICAO LDS_D_12
  • LDS_H_28: moved to ICAO LDS_D_13
  • LDS_H_29: moved to ICAO LDS_D_14
  • LDS_H_30: moved to ICAO LDS_D_15
  • LDS_H_31: moved to ICAO LDS_D_16
  • LDS_H_32: moved to ICAO LDS_D_17
  • LDS_H_33: moved to ICAO LDS_D_18
  • LDS_H_37: moved to ICAO LDS_D_19
  • LDS_H_38: moved to ICAO LDS_D_20
  • LDS_H_39: moved to ICAO LDS_D_21
  • LDS_H_40: moved to ICAO LDS_D_22
  • LDS_H_41: moved to ICAO LDS_D_23
  • LDS_H_42: moved to ICAO LDS_D_24
  • LDS_H_43: moved to ICAO LDS_D_25
  • LDS_H_44: moved to ICAO LDS_D_26 
  • LDS_H_48: moved to ICAO LDS_D_27 
  • LDS_H_49: moved to ICAO LDS_D_28 
  • LDS_H_53: moved to ICAO LDS_D_29 
  • LDS_H_67: moved to ICAO LDS_D_30 
  • LDS_H_68: moved to ICAO LDS_D_31 
  • LDS_H_86: moved to ICAO LDS_D_35
  • LDS_H_87: moved to ICAO LDS_D_36
  • LDS_H_88: moved to ICAO LDS_D_37
  • LDS_H_89: moved to ICAO LDS_D_38

New test cases

  • ISO7816_E_31: New test case to check dynamic binding between protocols
  • ISO7816_E_32: New test case to check TA including trust anchor update
  • ISO7816_E_33: New test case to check TA with two different trust anchors
  • ISO7816_E_34: New test case to check TA with offered but not needed trust anchor update
  • ISO7816_E_35: New test case to verify that the inspection system performs terminal authentication successfully with id-TA-RSA-v1-5-SHA-512 algorithm
  • ISO7816_E_36: New test case to verify that the inspection system performs terminal authentication successfully with id-TA-RSA-PSS-SHA-512 algorithm
  • ISO7816_E_37: New test case to verify that the inspection system performs terminal authentication successfully with id-TA-ECDSA-SHA-384 algorithm
  • ISO7816_E_38: New test case to verify that the inspection system performs terminal authentication successfully with id-TA-ECDSA-SHA-512 algorithm
  • LDS_H_90: New test case with EF.SOD inconsistent with EF.COM (more data groups)
  • LDS_H_91: New test case with EF.SOD inconsistent with EF.COM (less data groups)
  • LDS_H_92: New test case with EF.SOD inconsistent with EF.COM (different data groups)
  • LDS_H_93: New test case with EF.SOD with missing checksum of EF.CardAccess
  • LDS_H_94: New test case to verify that the inspection system performs correctly if EF.SOD contains RSASSA-PSS with SHA224, SHA224 DG hash, DS stored inside SOD
  • LDS_H_95: New test case to verify that the inspection system performs correctly if EF.SOD contains RSASSA-PSS with SHA384, SHA384 DG hash, DS stored inside SOD
  • LDS_H_96: New test case to verify that the inspection system performs correctly if EF.SOD contains RSASSA-PSS with SHA512, SHA512 DG hash, DS stored inside SOD
  • LDS_H_97: New test case to verify that the inspection system performs correctly if EF.SOD contains DSA with SHA224, SHA224 DG hash, DS stored inside SOD
  • LDS_H_98: New test case to verify that the inspection system performs correctly if EF.SOD contains DSA with SHA256, SHA256 DG hash, DS stored inside SOD
  • LDS_J_01: New test case with CardSecurity inconsistent with EF.CardAccess (more SecurityInfos)
  • LDS_J_02: New test case with CardSecurity inconsistent with EF.CardAccess (less SecurityInfos)
  • LDS_J_03: New test case with CardSecurity inconsistent with EF.CardAccess (different SecurityInfos)
  • LDS_J_03: New test case with an incorrect ChipAuthenticationPublicKeyInfo for PACE-CAM in EF.CardSecurity
  • LDS_J_04: New test case with an incorrect ChipAuthenticationPublicKeyInfo in EF.CardSecurity
  • LDS_K_01: New test case with valid encoding with two bytes length for APDU
  • LDS_K_02: New test case with valid encoding with three bytes length for APDU
  • LDS_K_03: New test case with only one valid value for command length
  • LDS_K_04: New test case with wrong tag 7F66

Modified test cases

  • ISO7816_E_01: Added profile ‚DPRCTD-SHA1‘
  • ISO7816_E_03: Added profile ‚DPRCTD-SHA1‘
  • ISO7816_E_05: Added profile ‚DPRCTD-SHA1‘
  • ISO7816_E_19: Clarification in purpose
  • LDS_H_01: Added profile ‚DPRCTD-SHA1 ‘
  • LDS_H_02: Added profile ‚DPRCTD-SHA1 ‘
  • LDS_H_08: Added profile ‚DPRCTD-SHA1 ‘
  • LDS_H_09: Added profile ‚DPRCTD-SHA1 ‘
  • LDS_H_10: Added profile ‚DPRCTD-SHA1 ‘
  • LDS_H_15: importance of test case changed form ‘Mandatory’ to ‘Optional’
  • LDS_H_79: Added profile ‚DPRCTD-SHA1‘
  • LDS_I_01: Clarification in purpose of test case

Deleted test cases

  • ISO7816_F_03: Test case deleted in version 1.5
  • LDS_H_16: Test case deleted in version 1.5

Focus extension of this blog to eIDAS token

Until today the focus of this blog was limited to ePassports or eMRTDs specified by BSI and ICAO. From now on this focus will be extended also to eIDAS token.

eIDAS Logo

An eIDAS token is specified also in BSI TR-03110. The technical guideline specifies a set of different algorithms and protocols that can be used in the area of identification and authorisation. One representative for a token like this is for example the German ID card (Personalausweis).

Additionally, a first prototype of an eIDAS token was implemented during a project called PersoSim on behalf of BSI. Goal of this project was to implement the functionality of a German ID card in a simulator including a virtual smart card reader.

Protocols specified in TR-03110 beyond eMRTD are:

  • Restricted Identification (RI)
  • Pseudonymous Signatures (PS)
  • Chip Authentication Version 2
  • Chip Authentication Version 3
  • Terminal Authentication Version 3
  • Enhanced Role Authentication (ERA)
  • Authorization Extension for additional attributes

From now on you can find test specifications for eIDAS token at the overview of test specifications. There are more and more eID documents using the protocols specified in in TR-03110 (e.g. Authorization Extension for LDS2 where entry and exit stamps are stored on the chip) and at the end of the day the corresponding test specifications are getting more and more important. That’s the reason why I decided to blog also about eIDAS token at this blog from now on.

Update of BSI TR-03105 Part 3.2 available

Introduction

The German BSI has released new versions of their test specifications TR-03105 Part 3. These test specifications covers the protocols in the context of chips used in eID documents. Part 3.2 covers security protocols used in common eMRTDs. This blog post describes the changes of this new version 1.5. The last version was released in 2014 and since this time some changes were necessary.

Beside several editorial changes and maintenance the most important changes of TR-03105 Part 3.2 Version 1.5 are the move of both test suites concerning Chip Authentication to the ICAO test specification part 3 and the new test suite for EF.ATR/INFO. The file EF.ATR/INFO is recommended by ICAO to store the buffer sizes that should be used by the terminal to read the chip content in a performant way. Maintenance includes updating the referenced documents and a consistent wording (e.g. ‘Data Group’ or ‘FID’) in the whole specification.

Certificates are specified now in a more comfortable way similar to the way used in TR-03105 Part 3.3: Certificate Holder Reference (CHR) and Certification Authority Reference (CAR) are now specified in the parameter block in a human-readable way and not in hex as before.

The specified security status – described in chapter 3.2.1 – was updated: A Secure Messaging session SHOULD (instead of MUST in the previous version) be aborted if and only if a secure messaging error occurs.

The list of abbreviations in chapter 1.1 was updated (e.g. FID or SFI) and corrected (e.g. CAR).

Profiles were adapted to handle the optional Basic Access Control (BAC) protocol and the optional file EF.ATR/INFO. Additionally all profiles for Chip Authentication (CA_KAT, CA_ATGA and KeyRef) are deleted or rather moved to ICAO part 3.

Note: TR-03105 Part 3.1 Version 1.2.1 contains a new requirement for test laboratories: “During the certification process the test laboratory must ensure that the features quoted by the applicant in his Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) are in fact in coincidence with the features supported and accordingly not supported by the chip”.

New test cases in version 1.5

BSI TR-03105 Part 3.2 contains the following new test cases / test units:

  • 7816_L_15: Test that the chip rejects an additional BAC run or resets extended access rights after successful PACE run (PACE, CA1, TA1, BAC)
  • 7816_L_16: Test that the chip rejects an additional PACE run or resets extended access rights after successful BAC run (BAC, CA1, TA1, PACE)
  • LDS_L: Test suite to verify the conformity of file EF.ATR/INFO

Modified test cases in version 1.5

BSI TR-03105 Part 3.2 contains the following modified test cases / test units / certificates:

  • DV_Cert_10c: Corrected CHR in certificate
  • DV_Cert_10d: Corrected CHR in certificate
  • DV_Cert_11b: Corrected CHR in certificate
  • 7816_H_xx: Used <Lc> instead of fixed encoded length of command in step 1
  • 7816_I and 7816_II: Test suites moved to ICAO Part 3
  • 7816_J_12: Accept also ’90 00′ as valid status word in step 1
  • 7816_K_1a: Added profile BAC
  • 7816_L_13: Added conditional step 10 to verify that access to data group 3 has NOT been granted
  • 7816_L_14: Corrected encoding of SELECT command in step 8
  • 7816_M_xx: Used <Lc> instead of fixed encoded length of command
  • LDS_E: Moved test cases LDS_E_1- LDS_E_4 (Chip Authentication) to ICAO part 3 and renumbering of test cases

It took more than a year to update this test specification in combination with Part 3.3 which handles eIDAS protocols and EACv2 used by eID cards. Several stake holders and members of ‘Deutsches Industrie Forum’ (DIF) commented both versions and at the end this version is a consensus of all participated bodies.

Update of ICAO RF and Protocol Test Specification

Introduction

Simultaneously the ICAO released updated and new versions of their ICAO test specifications for eMRTD and corresponding inspection systems. While the Technical AdvisorICAO Logoy Group (TAG) of ICAO endorsed the update on the ICAO website, from now on these test specifications can be referenced officially and can also be used for certification. Additionally, there is also a new test specification part 5 available focusing on PKI objects like certificates and revocation lists.

 

ICAO Test Specification Part 3 (eMRTD)

Finally version 2.11 of the ICAO test specification for eMRTDs is a result of two ISO SC17 WG3 TF4 meetings 2017 in Paris and 2018 in Tokyo and also a result of the interoperability test in Ispra 2017. First of all there are some interesting modifications compared with the previous version 2.10 released in 2016:

  • Test cases and ICS adoption for Chip Authentication Version 1 (test cases are moved from BSI TR-03105 Part 3.2)
  • Test of command robustness with invalid class bytes are removed
  • Clarifications concerning PACE test cases
  • Clarification concerning ISO execution errors
  • Clarification concerning extended length APDUs used during Active Authentication
  • Some corrections concerning LDS version 1.8
  • Additionally, there are some clarifications and minor editorial changes

New test cases in Version 2.11

Most noteworthy the ICAO test specification part 3 contains the following new test cases:

  • ISO7816_P_79: Negative test case to verify the Secure Messaging handling while PACE access is granted for the SELECT application command (bad send sequence counter)
  • ISO7816_R_07: Positive test case to verify the behavior of a PACE-protected eMRTD in response to the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
  • Test suite ISO7816_T: New test cases for Chip Authentication (this tests were moved from BSI TR-03105 Part 3.2 with minor corrections and remove robustness test of invalid class bytes)
  • LDS_E_01: Test the LDS tag of the DG14 object
  • LDS_E_02: Test the ASN.1 encoding of the SecurityInfos for Chip Authentication
  • LDS_E_03: Test the ASN.1 encoding of the ChipAuthenticationPublicKeyInfo
  • LDS_E_04: Test the ASN.1 encoding of the ChipAuthenticationInfo
  • LDS_K_05: Test the ASN.1 encoding of a PCKS#7 signedData object
  • LDS_K_06: Test the value that is encoded into the signedData element
  • LDS_K_07: Test the SignerInfo element of the signedData structure
  • LDS_K_08: Test the signing certificate used to verify the EF.CardSecurity object

Modified test cases in Version 2.11

The ICAO test specification part 3 contains the following modified test cases:

  • ISO7816_A_2: SELECT Application command with CLA byte ‘8F’ is removed
  • ISO7816_C_15: Test case removed (invalid CLA byte)
  • ISO7816_C_19: Test case removed (invalid CLA byte)
  • ISO7816_D_2: Test case removed (invalid CLA byte)
  • ISO7816_E_2: Test case removed (invalid CLA byte)
  • ISO7816_F_2: Test case removed (invalid CLA byte)
  • ISO7816_G_2: Test case removed (invalid CLA byte)
  • ISO7816_P_04: Test case removed (invalid CLA byte)
  • ISO7816_P_18: Test case removed
  • ISO7816_P_37: Test case removed (invalid CLA byte)
  • ISO7816_P_38: Test case removed (invalid CLA byte)
  • ISO7816_P_39: Test case removed (invalid CLA byte)
  • ISO7816_P_40: Test case removed (invalid CLA byte)
  • ISO7816_P_66: Hint, that in test scenario step 1 the length encoding of DO ’80’ must be correct
  • ISO7816_P_67: Hint, that in test scenario step 1 the length encoding of DO ’80’ must be correct
  • ISO7816_R_01: Generic length encoding of APDU
  • ISO7816_R_02: Generic use of DO ’97’ and length encoding of APDU
  • ISO7816_R_03: Hint, that INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command must use Secure Messaging if access control mechanism is supported
  • ISO7816_R_04: Hint, that INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command must use Secure Messaging if access control mechanism is supported
  • ISO781_S_03: Padding indicator ’01’ in DO ’85’ is removed (odd ins)
  • ISO781_S_04: Padding indicator ’01’ in DO ’85’ is removed (odd ins)
  • LDS_A_03: In EF.COM there is also LDS version 1.8 accepted
  • LDS_A_05: Purpose of test case is corrected
  • LDS_C_04: Check that the number of Biometric Information Group Templates (BIGT) is one
  • LDS_D_04: Check also the LDS security object version in test scenario step 4; a future version of Doc9303 part 10 requires that the signedData certificates field in LDS v1.8
    SHALL include the Document Signer Certificate (CDS)
  • LDS_D_06: Check that LDS Version Info element does not exist in test scenario step 8 and handle also LDS version 1.8 in this test case
  • LDS_D_07: Check that the validity period of the signing certificate MUST be within the validity period of the country signing certificate in test scenario step 4
  • Test suite LDS_E: Numbering of test cases has changed
  • LDS_E_07: Check also the hash algorithm output length of the signatureAlgorithm
  • LDS_J_05: ECDSA is also be handled in test scenario step 3 from now on

ICAO Test Specification Part 4 (Inspection Systems)

Also ICAO test specification part 4 version 2.11 is the result of a typical ISO process finalized by the same meetings in Paris and Tokyo of ISO SC17 WG3 TF4 mentioned above. Finally this specification contains also some interesting changes compared with the previous version 2.10 released in 2016:

  • Configuration of default EAC MRTD specifies EF.DG15
  • Specification of a default PACE-CAM protected eMRTD
  • Clarifications concerning PACE and PACE-CAM
  • Additionally, there are some clarifications and minor editorial changes.
  • Added profile AA.B4 to test signature generation scheme specified in ISO/IEC 9796-2 paragraph B.4.

New test cases in Version 2.11

The ICAO test specification part 4 contains the following new test cases:

  • ISO7816_E_11: Test case verifies that the inspection system performs the Active Authentication with RSA algorithm in the signature function and B.4 method
  • ISO7816_B_04: Positive test with BAC protected eMRTD and three line MRZ
  • ISO7816_G_16: Check correct execution of the Chip Authentication protocol
  • LDS_B_29: Test verifies that the test object can detect a mismatch between MRZ and EF.DG1 where MRZ uses TD2 format and EF.DG1 uses TD1 format
  • LDS_B_30: Test verifies that the test object can detect a mismatch between MRZ and EF.DG1 where MRZ uses TD1 format and EF.DG1 uses TD2 format
  • LDS_D_01: Added test cases for missing algorithm and signature combinations
  • LDS_D_19: Added test cases for DSA with various SHA algorithms
  • LDS_D_39: Test case verifies that the inspection system checks the signature in EF.CardSecurity and detects an invalid signature

Modified test cases in Version 2.11

The ICAO test specification part 4 contains the following modified test cases:

  • ISO7816_C_01: Test case include three line MRZ from now on
  • ISO7816_C_03: Editorial correction of protocol name
  • ISO7816_C_29: Use new configuration for PACE CAM protected eMRTD
  • ISO7816_C_30: Use new configuration for PACE CAM protected eMRTD
  • ISO7816_C_31: Use new configuration for PACE CAM protected eMRTD
  • ISO7816_C_32: Use new configuration for PACE CAM protected eMRTD
  • ISO7816_C_33: Use new configuration for PACE CAM protected eMRTD
  • ISO7816_C_34: Use a special configuration to indicate that the IS performs Passive Authentication
  • ISO7816_C_36: Change context form PACE-CAM to PACE (CAM -> GM)
  • ISO7816_C_39: Use new configuration for PACE CAM protected eMRTD
  • ISO7816_E_01: Use signature production function B.6
  • ISO7816_E_02: Clarification of EF.DG14 and specification of EF.DG15 and using of signature production function B.6
  • ISO7816_E_03: Use signature production function B.6
  • ISO7816_E_04: Use signature production function B.6
  • ISO7816_E_05: Use signature production function B.6
  • ISO7816_E_06: Use signature production function B.6
  • ISO7816_E_07: Use signature production function B.6
  • ISO7816_E_08: Use signature production function B.6
  • ISO7816_E_09: Perform Active Authentication with B.6 method of ISO/IEC 9796-2 and use RSA-SHA1; Hint, that the RSA operation during AA must result in a value bigger than n/2 with n being the modulus to ensure that method B6 is really used in this test case
  • ISO7816_E_10: Use signature production function B.6
  • ISO7816_F_03: Test case removed
  • ISO7816_G_07: Correction of key agreement algorithm (id-CA-DH-3DES-CBC-CBC)
  • ISO7816_G_11: Correction of key agreement algorithm (id-CA-DH-3DES-CBC-CBC)
  • ISO7816_G_15: Use default EAC configuration in this test case
  • LDS_A_01: Correction in EF.COM (removed data groups)
  • LDS_A_02: Correction in EF.COM (removed data groups)
  • LDS_A_03: Correction in EF.COM (removed data groups and correction of increased length)
  • LDS_A_04: Correction in EF.COM (removed data groups)
  • LDS_A_05: Correction in EF.COM (removed data groups)
  • LDS_A_06: Correction in EF.COM (removed data groups)
  • LDS_A_07: Correction in EF.COM (removed data groups)
  • LDS_A_08: Correction in EF.COM (removed data groups)
  • LDS_A_09: Correction in EF.COM (removed data groups)
  • LDS_A_10: Correction in EF.COM (removed data groups)
  • LDS_C_14: Access condition of EF.DG2 changed from BAC to PACE
  • LDS_C_17: Corrected ID of configuration
  • LDS_D_26: Access condition of EF.SOD changed from BAC to PACE
  • LDS_D_35: Corrected wording in specification of EF.SOD
  • LDS_D_36: Corrected wording in specification of EF.SOD and corrected title of test case
  • LDS_D_37: Corrected wording in specification of EF.SOD and corrected title of test case
  • LDS_D_38: Test case removed
  • LDS_E_01: Access condition of EF.DG15 changed from BAC to PACE
  • LDS_E_02: Access condition of EF.DG15 changed from BAC to PACE
  • LDS_E_03: Access condition of EF.DG15 changed from BAC to PACE
  • LDS_F_01: Correction in content of EF.DG14 (generic length)
  • LDS_F_02: Correction in content of EF.DG14 (generic length)
  • LDS_F_03: Correction in content of EF.DG14 (generic length)

New and noteworthy ICAO documents and updates

As mentioned in the introduction ICAO has release a new test specification for PKI objects. The new part 5 of ICAO test specifications is focusing on various things used in this context like certificates, certificate revocation lists (CRL) as well as master and deviation lists. Furthermore, there is a new version 1.7 of the technical report Visible Digital Seals for Non-Electronic Documents available.  Technical report Portrait Quality is released in version 1.0 where reference facial images for eMRTD are specified. Concerning LDS2 the technical report LDS2 – PKI specifies the PKI to support the ICAO LDS2 project including travel records, visa records and additional biometrics. Last but not least there is also a new version of technical report Logical Data Structure (LDS) for Storage of Data in the Contactless IC, Doc 9303-10 LDS 2 – New Applications available at the ICAO website.

Effects of GDPR to protocolbench

Within the scope of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) I had a look at the data protection on this website and improved the security now. Implementing some improvements, the privacy of the visitors is now fortified.

Therefore to get an idea concerning GDPR the following quote of wikipedia might be helpful:

“The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EU) 2016/679 is a regulation in EU law on data protection and privacy for all individuals within the European Union. It also addresses the export of personal data outside the EU. The GDPR aims primarily to give control to citizens and residents over their personal data and to simplify the regulatory environment for international business by unifying the regulation within the EU.” (wikipedia)

The changes concerning this website are listed as following:

  • The website and the blog are now secured by a TLS/SSL certificate. I used the cleanup to secure all traffic by TLS/SSL now to protect the privacy of the visitors of this blog.
  • Google Analytics: I use google analytics to get information concerning the visitors of this blog. This feedback allows improving the quality and the content of my blog. The data is collected in a pseudonymous way with the goal to protect the privacy of the visitors.
  • Sharing buttons: From now on I’ using buttons implemented by heise called Shariff. The plugin Shariff Wrapper enables website users to share their favorite content without compromising their privacy. By using new buttons, the complete numeration is set to 0.
  • As a result of GDPR I’ve added a new page: data protection (currently in German language) describing all relevant information concerning GDPR. And if you don’t want to be tracked by google analytics, you can find a link at the end of this site to install a cookie to deactivate measurement by google analytics.
  • Finally, I’ve changed the image in the header :)

I’m looking forward to posting new articles in the future based on a modernized website. Additionally, I hope that you will visit my blog also in the future from time to time to get interesting impressions and information.

First results of eMRTD Interoperability Test 2017 in Ispra

The European Commission (EC) organised another eMRTD interoperability test. This time the event took place in Ispra at the Joint Research Center of the European Union. The objective of this interoperability test was to assure that countries and companies have established a stable PACE protocol in their eMRTD, respective ePassports, and ID cards.

Test setup of eMRTD interoperability test

Every participant had the chance to submit up to two different sets of documents with different implementations. Altogether there were 42 different samples available at the beginning of the event. 2 samples didn’t pass the smoke test and one sample was not suitable to be tested by the labs. All remaining samples were tested in two different test procedures: crossover test and conformity test. Twelve document verification system providers with 16 different solutions took part in the crossover test. And 23 document providers threw 42 sets in the ring (28 countries, 14 industries).

In this blog post the conformity test is focused on, because protocols are in foreground in this kind of test. There were three test labs (Keolabs, UL and secunet) taking part in the interoperability test with their test tools to perform a subset of “ICAO TR RF Protocol and Application Test Standard for e-Passports, Part 3” (Version 2.10). The subset includes the following test suites and test cases:

  • ISO7816_O: Security conditions for PACE protected eMRTDs
  • ISO7816_P: Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACEv2)
  • ISO7816_Q: Command READ and SELECT for file EF.CardAccess
  • LDS_E: Matching between EF.DG14 and EF.CardAccess
  • LDS_I: Structure of EF.CardAccess
  • LDS_K: Structure of EF.CardSecurity
  • LDS_D_06: Test case to perform Passive Authentication

Information concerning documents

The document providers describe in the implementation conformance statement (ICS) the features of their chips. Not all ICS were fulfilled consistently, so the following information concerning the documents should be read carefully. Concerning the LDS version 16 providers reported version 1.7 to be used in their documents. And three reported version 1.8, while all others don’t deliver any information concerning the version number.

The following diagram describes the relation between DH and ECDH in PACE:

PACE algorithms

PACE algorithms

The following diagram describes the relation of the mapping protocols in PACE:

Mapping protocols in PACE

Mapping protocols

16 documents supported besides the MRZ also a CAN as a password to get access to the stored data.

Again, the number of PACEInfos store in EF.CardAccess varied:

  • 28 documents stored one PACEInfo,
  • Eight documents stored two PACEInfos,
  • One stored each three, seven or ten PACEInfos.

Investigations concerning EF.ATR/INFO in documents

The file EF.ATR/INFO allows storing some information about the chip, that allows the reader to handle the chip optimally. On this way the chip can offer the ideal buffer size used with extended length during reading and writing. In context of the event I had a closer look at EF.ATR/INFO. 26 documents of 42 stored an EF.ATR/INFO but 5 of them don’t offer information concerning extended length and buffer sizes there. So at the end I’ve investigated the reading buffer sizes of 21 documents of the eMRTD interoperability test with the following result:

  • Seven documents support buffer sizes between 1 and 1.5 KByte,
  • Three documents support buffer sizes between 1.5 and 2 KByte,
  • Eleven documents support buffer sizes of ~64 KByte.

Buffer sizes for reading in EF.ATR/INFO

Buffer sizes in EF.ATR/INFO (reading)

With these large buffer sizes data groups like DG2 storing the facial image or DG3 storing the finger prints can be read in only one command. This allows the inspection system to read the content of the chip faster and improves the reading time at eGates.

Results of conformity testing

During the conformity test, all three test labs performed 18.135 test cases altogether. Less than 1 percent of these test cases failed during the conformity test.

Overall results (layer 6 and layer 7):

  • Passed: 11.563
  • Failed: 155 (0,86%)
  • Not applicable: 6.417

Layer 6 (16.614 test cases performed):

  • Passed: 10.885
  • Failed: 124 (0,74%)

Layer 7 (1.521 test cases performed):

  • Passed: 679
  • Failed: 32 (2,10%)

The following diagram shows failed test cases per document during the eMRTD interoperability test:

Number of failures per document

Number of failures per document

The diagram below shows the number of failure per test case during the eMRTD interoperability test:

Failures per test case

Failures per test case

Observations during conformity testing

  • There are minor differences between implementation conformance statement (ICS) and chip.
  • Test results differ between test labs in some test cases.
  • There are differences in handling errors at the test tools and labs (e.g. no CAN causes a failure at the one lab and a ‘not applicable’ at the other lab).
  • Relatively more failures on layer 7 (personalisation) than on layer 6 (COS).
  • Very good quality of chip and personalisation.
  • Improvements during the last interoperability tests in London 2016 and Madrid 2014.
  • Stable specifications (BSI TR-03110, ICAO Doc 9303) and test specifications (BSI TR-03105, ICAO TR Part 3).

Security risk Smart Home – The Lives of Others

During IT Flash Paderborn #3 I gave a short presentation and demo concerning security risk smart home. With the described passive attack you can profile all residents of the smart home. And with the described active attack you can manipulate the smart home and the devices used there.

Picture of the film 'The Lives of Others'

From the movie ‘The Lives of Others’

In one of my previous blog post I described how to run a passive attack on a smart home in context of the protocol EnOcean. With the collected information you can set up a profile of all people living in this home.

For the passive attack I used a new tool that I own for a few weeks now: HackRF One. It’s an typical piece of hardware that you can use in context of Software Defined Radio (SDR). You can see this helpful tool on the following picture (Source: Great Scott Gadgets):

Picture of HackRF One

HackRF One

HackRF One was initiated as a Kickstarter project a few years ago and is used by a large community in the area of reengineering protocols. In my demonstration I used HackRF One on the one hand to find the exact frequency that is used by the EnOcean devices that I used. And on the other hand I used HackRF One to capture and replay the EnOcean telegram.

In a first step you need the exact frequency that is used by your EnOcean stuff. To find this frequency I used the tool gqrx. Gqrx is an open source software defined radio receiver powered by the project GNU Radio. The tool allows visualizing frequencies that are used in your environment. For example: EnOcean is works on 868 MHz, but gqrx helps you to find the exact frequency of this protocol, in my case: 868,290 MHz. The following screenshot shows the way gqrx works (Source gqrx-website):

Screenshot of gqrx

Screenshot of gqrx

As soon as you have found the exact frequency, you can use the software distributed with HackRF one to capture and to replay the messages in your smart home. In the demonstration I used a pushed button and a light actuator adapter to visualize the attack.

In case of EnOcean there are mechanisms to protect against these attacks available. One of these mechanisms is called ‘Rolling Code’ where telegrams are encrypted which makes the capture and replay attack above useless. The following command stores the traffic in a file:

hackrf_transfer -t switch.raw -f 869290000

Once the traffic is stored in a file, you can send this information again (capture and replay) with your HackRF One with the following command:

hackrf_transfer -t switch.raw -f 869290000 -x 47

You can find some more information in the slides of presentation. As you can see, smart home devices should be used carefully if you want to protect your privacy. Today it’s very easy to collect and manipulate a smart home. So always keep in mind the security risk smart home when you plan your smart home.

Call for Participation: Interoperability Test 2017 in Ispra

The European Commission will organize conformity and interoperability tests for eMRTDs together with a conference on 25th and 26th September 2017. It will be held in the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) premises in Ispra, Italy. The tests will focus on the latest access control specifications (e.g. the operation of the PACE protocol with Chip Authentication Mapping). This security mechanism, known as “Password Authenticated Connection Establishment with Chip Authentication Mapping” (PACE-CAM) is specified in Technical Report BSI TR-03110 “Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS token” and it combines PACE and Chip Authentication (CA) into one protocol leading to faster ID document verification.

Logo JRC

The conference will take place on the second day (26/09/2017) and will include speakers from the EU Commission, ICAO (requested) and Member States (requested). At its end, the high-level aggregate results of the tests will be presented.

The main beneficiaries of these tests are EU Member States. Depending on the number of EU Member States that will participate in the event, and provided that it is possible from an organisational perspective, a limited number of non-EU ICAO Member States and private sector travel document manufacturers will be allowed to participate in the test (on a first come first serve basis).

The test will focus on the implementation of PACE as specified in the Technical Report “Radio Frequency Protocol and Application Test Standard for eMRTD Part 3 Tests for Application Protocol and Logical Data Structure“, Version: 2.10, July 2016.

You can find the Call for Participation for the interoperability test here with more information concerning preregistration etc. See you in Ispra!

Apple adds NFC support to iOS 11

During Apple’s Word Wide Developer Conference (WWDC) this week the company shared the latest information concerning support of Near Field Communication (NFC) protocol in iOS 11. Developers coding for iOS 11 will be able to create apps that can read NFC tags. This opens the door for wireless exchange of information between an iPhone and various connected devices in a user’s environment.

Apple and NFC

Apple and NFC (Wikipedia)

Currently the NFC chip in the iPhone is only used to handle contactless Apple Pay transactions. But in the new framework called Core NFC the company provide the foundation for multiple use cases by third-party apps. Using Core NFC, you can read tags of types 1 through 5 that contain data in the NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF). At present the API supports only read access for the tags. Hopefully in the future there will be also the possibility integrated to write to the tags. With the new framework Apple could let third-party developers make use of NFC in new ways, or it could simply expand NFC functions beyond Apple Pay for use in its own apps and services. The specification says, “For example, your app might give users information about products they find in a store or exhibits they visit in a museum”.

There are also first code samples available, e.g. iOS11-NFC-Example implemented by Hans Knöchel. In his GitHub repository Hans describes a quick example showing how to use the API in iOS 11 and Swift 4. The new framework requires at least XCode 9, iOS 11 and an iPhone 7 or iPhone 7 Plus.

However, the possibilities for NFC outside of banking area look set to expand with Apple’s next-generation mobile operating systems. So I’m looking forward to blogging of an additional version of iOS, which also allows complex contactless protocols we know in the context of eID like Chip Authentication Mapping (PACE-CAM). This would enable the iPhone to read ID cards of ePassports using ISO 14443 for contactless communication. Nevertheless this first step in iOS opens a world of possibilities for new apps on iPhones.