

PADERBORN IT-FLASH #3

---

# SECURITY RISK SMART HOME

HOLGER FUNKE

## SPYING 1.0



## SMART HOME REQUIREMENTS

- ▶ Comfort, Compatibility, Availability
- ▶ Protection against unauthorized use
- ▶ Protection of privacy



Source: Huffington Post


## SITUATION: SEVERAL ISOLATED PROTOCOLS

### ▶ Cable:

- ▶ KNX, LAN, Power Line

### ▶ Wireless:

- ▶ KNX-RF, FS-20
- ▶ WiFi, Dect, Bluetooth (Low Energy)
- ▶ ZigBee, Z-Wave
- ▶ Homematic (BidCoS), RWE
- ▶ *EnOcean*



## ENOCEAN IN A NUTSHELL

- ▶ Energy Harvesting (no batteries)
- ▶ Short, uni- or bidirectional radio messages
- ▶ Frequency: 868 MHz
  - ▶ Limitation in Germany: sending 36 sec / hour
- ▶ International standard: ISO/IEC 14543-3-10
- ▶ Several vendors using EnOcean components:
  - ▶ actors, sensors, integration in e.g. openHAB



## ENOCCEAN TELEGRAMS

- ▶ Payload of a telegram: 14 bytes (plus Chaining)
- ▶ Header, Data, CRC
- ▶ Unique ID (MAC-address)
- ▶ EnOcean Equipment Profiles
- ▶ Rolling Code available

Sync Byte		1 Byte
Header	Data Length	2 Bytes
	Optional Length	1 Byte
	Packet Type	1 Byte
CRC8 Header		1 Byte
Data		1...n Bytes
Optional Data		0...n Bytes
CRC8 Data		1 Byte

## PASSIVE ATTACK ON ENOCEAN TELEGRAMS

- ▶ Idea: Log telegrams to collect data of Smart Home
- ▶ Raspberry Pi with Power Bank or WakaWaka
- ▶ EnOcean Stick (USB300) or SoC TRX 8051
- ▶ Software to log telegrams, e.g. EnOceanSpy (github)
- ▶ Format collected data as graph
  - ▶ Who communicates with which device?
  - ▶ Who sends which information?
- ▶ EnOcean Specification, Software: freely available

# DEMO PASSIVE ATTACK



## ACTIVE ATTACK: CAPTURE & REPLAY

- ▶ Problem: Activator and sensor are linked
- ▶ Activator expects ID of device (sender)
- ▶ Solution 1: USB310 can change the MAC address
- ▶ Solution 2: Capture & Replay Attack
  - ▶ Software Defined Radio (SDR) tools: HackRF One
  - ▶ Capture complete telegram including ID and replay telegram

# DEMO C&R ATTACK

## SPYING 2.0

- ▶ Profile of resident can be set up automatically
  - ▶ cheap hardware, no detection
- ▶ Easy to overtake and manipulate complete Smart Home

That's not a good idea:



## HOW TO PROTECT YOUR SMART HOME

- ▶ Use encryption of messages (EnOcean: Rolling Code)
  - ▶ Storing keys, RNG, Firmware Updates, Personalization
    - ▶ Smart Cards?
- ▶ Send dummy messages to confuse
- ▶ The less data the better!

# THANKS FOR YOUR PATIENCE QUESTIONS?

▶ Contact:

Holger Funke

[blog.protocolbench.org](http://blog.protocolbench.org)

[twitter.com/holgerfunke](https://twitter.com/holgerfunke)