Tag Archives: SAC

First results of eMRTD Interoperability Test 2016

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During 10th Security Document World 2016 an additional Interoperability Test for eMRTD with PACE took place in London. In context of ePassports this was the 14th event starting 2003 on Canberra. This time there were two test labs involved, 17 document providers and twelve inspection system providers. Here I will focus on the conformity test including test labs and document providers and the InteropTest results. The event was organised by the colleagues of secunet. The following document providers delivered in sum 27 samples:

Logo of SDW InteropTest

  • Arjo Systems
  • Atos IT Solutions and Services
  • Bundesdruckerei
  • Canadian Banknote Company
  • cryptovision
  • De La Rue
  • Gemalto
  • ID&Trust
  • Imprimerie Nationale Group
  • Iris Corporation Berhad
  • MaskTech
  • Morpho
  • NXP Semiconductors
  • Oberthur Technologies
  • PAV Card
  • Polygraph combine ‘Ukraina’
  • PWPW

And the following test laboratories performed a subset of tests focusing on PACE (and of course PACE-CAM):

  • Keolabs (France)
  • HJP Consulting / TÜViT (Germany)

The test cases performed during the event based on ICAO’s test specification ‘RF Protocol and Application Test Standard for eMRTD – Part 3‘ Version 2.08 RC2 including some minor adaptions based on the last WG3TF4 meeting in Berlin. The final version 2.08 of this test specification will be released soon and deltas will be listed in an additional blog post here. With focus on PACE-CAM the following test suites were performed by both test labs:

  • Test Unit 7816_O (Security Conditions for PACE-protected eMRTDs)
  • Test Unit 7816_P (Password Authenticated Connection Establishment)
  • Test Unit 7816_Q (Select and Read EF.CardAccess)
  • Test Unit 7816_S (Select and Read EF.CardSecurity)
  • Test Unit LDS_E (Data Group 14)
  • Test Unit LDS_I (EF.CardAccess)
  • Test Unit LDS_K (EF.CardSecurity)

Some statistics concerning the samples:

  • PACE-CAM was supported in the following types:
    • Generic Mapping (GM), Chip Authentication Mapping (CAM): 18 samples
    • Integrated Mapping (IM), CAM: 4 samples
    • GM, IM and CAM: 4 samples
  • LDS:
    • 25 samples used LDS1.7
    • 1 sample used LDS1.8
    • 1 sample used LDS2.0 (with backward compatibility to LDS1.7)

In the preliminary InteropTest results presented by Michael Schlüter during the SDW he mentioned, that 8502 test cases were performed during conformity testing by the test labs and 98% of the relevant test cases were passed by the samples. Additionally, the test results of both labs were fairly consistent. There was one test case that causes the most failures and this test case verifies ChipAuthenticationPublicKey in EF.CardSecurity (LDS_K_2). Here we need some clarification in the specification Doc9303 and finally in the test specification.

During the crossover test there were three problems detected: At first the sequence of PACE, CA and TA was performed correctly while the sequence of PACE-CAM and TA causes some problems during the inspection procedure of the readers. This might be based in the fact, that PACE-CAM is specified in an ICAO document and TA in a BSI document. Some inspection systems had also problems with alternative File IDs for EF.CVCA. The alternative FID can be defined in TerminalAuthenticationInfo (see A.1.1.3 in TR-03110 Part 3) and must be used by the inspection systems to address and read EF.CVCA. But a bad surprise in the InteropTest results was, that around 50% of the inspection systems don’t perform Passive Authentication (PA) correctly. During the preparation of the InteropTest a wrong CSCA certificate was distributed and 50% of the systems have not detected this wrong certificate, this means: 50% of the inspection systems failed in Passive Authentication! During the conference Dr. Uwe Seidel (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA) noticed, that this number mirrors the real world and that in fact PA is currently a real problem in border control.

The InteropTest results can be summed up in two statements:

  1. There is a very good quality of the eMRTD samples.
  2. Reader vendors have still some work to do, especially to implement Passive Authentication correctly.

A detailed test report of this event and the InteropTest results will be published by secunet in June 2016.

Update: The final test report can now be downloaded here (after a short registration at the SDW website).

Maintenance release of BSI TR-03105 Part 5.1

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The German BSI has published a maintenance release of technical guideline TR-03105 Part 5.1 Version 1.41 for inspection systems with Extended Access Control (EAC).

Since last release of TR-03105 several (mostly editorial) comments were resolved and integrated in this maintenance release. Part 5.1 describes conformity tests for inspection systems with protocols like PACE, Terminal Authentication and Chip Authentication typically used at (automatic) border control, e.g. eGates.

Maintenance of TR-03105 for inspection systems, http://www.iconarchive.com/artist/oxygen-icons.org.html

Besides some editorial changes the new version 1.41 contains the following modifications:

  • ISO7816_G_36: If a EF.CardAccess contains an invalid OID for PACE-CAM, the inspection system shall use an alternative mapping protocol, that is supported by the chip.
  • ISO7816_G_37: This test case is deleted, because it’s not necessary for an inspection system to check that GM and IM are also supported by the chip besides PACE-CAM.
  • ISO7816_G_41: Curves with parameterID 0, 1 and 2 are based on DH and DH is not supported in context of PACE-CAM. So these curves are deleted.
  • LDS_H_86: Correction in expected result (PASS instead of FAIL).
  • Chapter 7: Relevant algorithms and OIDs for PACE, that must be supported by the inspection system, are added.
  • Chapter 7: Update of hashing algorithms.

For the next major update there should be a discussion how to handle fingerprints (data group 3, EF.DG3) and iris (data group 4, EF.DG4) of people who don’t have a finger or an iris. In this case these data groups should store an empty but valid data structure. Currently there are no test cases specified for these situations in TR-03105 Part 5.1. But inspection systems should be able to handle such cases also, of course.

So you can see, that test specifications in context of eMRTD (ePassports) and inspection systems are always in progress. If you have any comments concerning these test specifications or ideas of test cases, that should also be performed focusing on interoperability, please don’t hesitate to contact me or leave a comment.

Interoperability Test during SDW in May 2016

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puzzle - interoperability test

Puzzle of InteropTest

Another interoperability test in context of ePassports (eMRTD) and inspection systems will be performed during SecurityDocumentWorld 2016 in London. The test will be focused on Supplemental Access Control (SAC) respective PACEv2, a security protocol to protect personal data stored in electronic ID documents.

An interoperability test is similar to a plugtest performed e.g. by ETSI. It’s an event during which devices (ePassport, inspection systems and test tools) are tested for interoperability with emerging standards by physically connecting them. This procedure is called crossover testing and allows all vendors to test their devices against other devices. The efforts to perform this kind of test increases very strongly with every ePassport and inspection system. Therefore these kind of tests can be performed only with a small number of devices under test.

Crossover Testing

Crossover Testing

Additionally, there is the opportunity besides this crossover tests to test the devices against conformity test suites implemented in test tools like open source tool GlobalTester. This procedure reduces efforts and allows comprehensive failure analyses of the devices like ePassports or inspection systems. To assure interoperability it is state of the art to set up test specifications. These specifications are implemented by the test labs respectively in the test tools they use.

Conformity Testing

Conformity Testing

There are well established test specifications available, both for ePassports and for inspection systems. Previous interoperability tests took place in Madrid (2014) and London (2013). Both events focused also on SAC/PACE.

If you are interested as a document provider, as a vendor of an inspection system, as a test lab or as an observer, you can register here.

Looking forward to seeing you in London during the InteropTest!

BTW: The EU article 6 group is preparing a document describing how to process an interoperability test and how to prepare such an event.

Mapping between protocols and test specifications

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Introduction

This posting describes the current relation between test specifications and the protocols used in context of ePassports (eMRTD) and eID cards including their associated readers (terminals) and inspection systems.

This mapping reflects the current(!) status quo of protocols and their test specifications. All these specifications are in intensive editing at present.

Mapping between protocols and test specifications

The following image represents the mapping between protocols and the corresponding test specifications:

Mapping between protocols and test specifications

Mapping between protocols and test specifications in context of eID

You can see all protocols used currently in context of ePassports and eID cards in the rows and in the columns you can find specifications focusing on testing these protocols. For example you can find the test cases for Active Authentcation in the specification ICAO TR Protocol Testing Part 3 for chips and in BSI TR-03105 Part 5.1 for inspection systems.

As soon as there are updates available I will present here in this blog the new structure of these test specifications, including new protocols like Pseudonymous Signatures (PS), Chip Authentication Version 3 (CAv3) or Enhanced Role Authentication (ERA).

Abbreviation of protocols referred here

BAC: Basic Access Control
AA: Active Authentication
PACE: Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
SAC: Supplemental Access Control
CA: Chip Authentication
TA: Terminal Authentication
EAC: Extended Access Control
RI: Restricted Identification
eSign: electronic Signature

Test Specifications referred here

Short Name Title
TR-03105 3.1 BSI Test plan for eMRTD Application Protocol and Logical Data Structure
TR-03105 3.2 BSI Test plan for eMRTDs with EACv1
TR-03105 3.3 BSI Test plan for eID-Cards with Advanced Security Mechanisms EAC 2.0
TR-03105 3.4 BSI Test plan for eID-cards with eSign-application acc. to BSI TR-03117
TR – RF and Protocol Testing Part 3 ICAO TR – RF and Protocol Testing Part 3
TR-03105 5.1 BSI Test plan for ICAO compliant Inspection Systems with EAC
TR-03105 5.2 BSI Test plan for eID and eSign compliant eCard reader systems with EACv2

Update (30.11.2015)

Once again, you can find some discussions concerning this posting at LinkedIn.

Update of RF and Protocol Testing Part 3 V2.07 online

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There is an maintenance update of ICAO’s test specification ‘RF and Protocol Testing Part 3‘ available since today. The specification is focusing on conformity testing and protocol testing for ePassports implementing protocols like BAC and Supplemental Access Control (SAC) respective PACE v2.

The Technical Advisory Group (TAG) of ICAO endorsed the release on the ICAO website, so from now on the test specification can be referenced officially. In version 2.07 of the test specification there are no technical or fundamental changes, but editorial changes. The following test cases are modified in the new release 2.07:

  • ISO7816_B_16: Profile corrected
  • ISO7816_B_26: Added version
  • ISO7816_B_34: Profile corrected
  • ISO7816_B_52: Profile corrected
  • ISO7816_D_06: Updated version
  • ISO7816_D_09 – ISO7816_D_22: Profile corrected and version updated
  • ISO7816_E_09 – ISO7816_E_22: Profile corrected and version updated
  • ISO7816_F_20: Profile corrected and version updated
  • ISO7816_G_20: Profile corrected and version updated
  • ISO7816_O_12: Deleted obsolete Test-ID
  • ISO7816_O_13: Corrected sequence tags
  • ISO7816_O_31: Deleted obsolete Test-ID
  • ISO7816_O_35: Added missing caption
  • ISO7816_P_xx:  Deleted sample in description of step 1 (‘i.e. more than one set of
    domain parameters are available for PACE’)
  • ISO7816_P_04: Corrected numbering in expected results
  • ISO7816_P_06: Corrected numbering in expected results
  • ISO7816_P_07: Corrected numbering in expected results
  • ISO7816_P_14: Updated version
  • ISO7816_P_74: In preconditions step 3 concretized concerning PACEInfos in EF.CardAccess
  • ISO7816_Q_03: Added missing reference TR-SAC
  • LDS_D_06: Corrected typos in step 8

 

With the new edition of Doc 9303 several technical reports are now obsolete except the test specifications. These test specifications are still independent documents.

Update of ICAO Doc 9303 Edition

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International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has released the seventh edition of ICAO Doc 9303. This document is the de-facto standard for machine readable travel documents (MRTD). It specifies passports and visas starting with the dimensions of the travel document and ending with the specification of protocols used by the chip integrated in travel documents.

ICAO Doc 9303 Title page

A fundamental problem of the old sixth edition of Doc 9303 (released 2006) resides in the fact, that there are in sum 14 supplemental documents. All of these supplements include clarifications and corrections of Doc 9303, e.g. Supplement 14 contains 253 different issues. Additionally, there are separate documents specifying new protocols like Supplemental Access Control (SAC) also known as PACE v2. So ICAO started in 2011 to re-structure the specifications with the result that all these technical reports, guidelines and supplements are now consolidated in the seventh edition of ICAO Doc 9303. Also several inconsistencies of the documents are resolved. On this way several technical reports, like TR – Supplemental Access Control for MRTDs V1.1 and TR LDS and PKI Maintenance V2.0, are obsolete now with the seventh edition of Doc 9303.

The new edition of ICAO Doc 9303 consists now of twelve parts:

  • Part 1: Introduction
  • Part 2: Specifications for the security of the design, manufacture and issuance of MRTDs
  • Part 3: Specifications common to all MRTDs
  • Part 4: Specifications for Machine Readable Passports (MRPs) and other td3 size MRTDs
  • Part 5: Specifications for td1 size Machine Readable Official Travel Documents (MROTDs)
  • Part 6: Specifications for td2 size Machine Readable Official Travel Documents (MROTDs)
  • Part 7: Machine Readable Visas
  • Part 8: RFU (Reserved for future use): Emergency Travel Documents
  • Part 9: Deployment of biometric identification and electronic storage of data in eMRTDs
  • Part 10: Logical Data Structure (LDS) for storage of biometrics and other data in the contactless integrated circuit (IC)
  • Part 11: Security mechanisms for MRTDs
  • Part 12: Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for MRTDs

From a protocol point of view there are two interesting parts in Doc 9303: part 10 describes the data structures used in a smart card to store information. In addition part 11 describes the technical protocols to get access to this data, e.g. Chip Authentication Mapping.

Special thanks to Garleen Tomney-McGann working at ICAO headquarter in Montreal. As a member of the Traveller Identification Programme (TRIP) she has coordinated all the activities resulting in the seventh release of ICAO Doc 9303.

Chip Authentication Mapping

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Supplemental Access Control (SAC) is a set of security protocols published by ICAO to protect personal data stored in electronic travel documents like ePassports and ID cards. One protocol of SAC is the well known Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) protocol, which supplements and enhances Basic Access Control (BAC). PACE was developed originally by the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) to provide a cryptographic protocol for the German ID card (Personalausweis).

Currently PACE supports three different kinds of mapping as part of the security protocol execution:

  • Generic Mapping (GM) based on a Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement,
  • Integrated Mapping (IM) based on a direct mapping of a field element to the cryptographic group,
  • Chip Authentication Mapping (CAM) extends Generic Mapping and integrates Chip Authentication.

Since Version 1.1 of ICAO technical report TR – Supplemental Access Control for MRTDs there is a specification of a third mapping procedure for PACE, the Chip Authentication Mapping (CAM), which extends established Generic Mapping. This third mapping protocol combines PACE and Chip Authentication into only one protocol PACE-CAM. On this way it is possible to perform Chip Authentication Mapping faster than both separate protocols.

The chip indicates the support of Chip Authentication Mapping by the presence of a corresponding PACEInfo structure in the file EF.CardAccess.  The Object Identifier (OID) defines the cryptographic parameters that must be used during the mapping. CAM supports AES with key length of 128, 192 and 256. But in contrast to GM and IM there is no support of 3DES (for security reasons) and only support of ECDH.

The mapping phase of the CAM itself is 100% identical to the mapping phase of GM. The ephemeral public keys are encoded as elliptic curve points.

To perform PACE a chain of GENERAL AUTHENTICATE commands is used. For CAM there is a deviation in step 4 when Mutual Authentication is performed. In this step the terminal sends the authentication token of the terminal (tag 0x85) and expects the authentication token of the chip (tag 0x86). Additionally, in CAM the chip sends also encrypted chip authentication data with tag 0x8A to the terminal.

If GENERAL AUTHENTICATION procedure was performed successfully, the terminal must perform the following two steps to authenticate the chip:

  1. Read and verify EF.CardSecurity,
  2. Use the public key of EF.CardSecurity in combination with the mapping data and the encrypted chip authentication data received during CAM to authenticate the chip.

It is necessary to perform Passive Authentication in combination with Chip Authentication Mapping to consider that the chip is genuine.

The benefit of Chip Authentication Mapping is the combination of PACE and Chip Authentication. The combination of both protocols saves time and allows a faster performance than the execution of both protocol separately.

You can find interesting information concerning CAM in the patent of Dr. Dennis Kügler and Dr. Jens Bender in the corresponding document of the German Patent and Trademark Office.

 

Update of RF and Protocol Testing Part 3 V2.06 online

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The MRTD group of ICAO has released an update (version 2.06) with clarifications of their technical report RF and Protocol Testing Part 3 focusing on conformity test and protocol testing for ePassports implementing protocols like BAC and Supplemetal Access Control (SAC) respective PACEv1.

The new version 2.06 of TR-03105 Part 3.2 focusing on protocol testing includes the following changes:

  • General: Several test cases accept now additionally also an Execution Error in expected results.
  • General: Instead of ePassports we are talking now about eMRTD.
  • General: An additional profile was added: “EAC or PACE or AA-ECDSA”.
  • General: The profiles of several test cases were extended.
  • General: Compatibility to both PACE and BAC in most test cases of ISO_D and ISO_E.
  • General: Use CAR from DV certificate during Terminal Authentication instead of reading CAR from file EF.CVCA.
  • ISO7816_C_04: The command GET CHALLENGE must not have been performed.
  • ISO7816_P_10: This test case was deleted.
  • ISO7816_P_73: Allows multiple PACEInfo if just one parameter ID is being used.
  • ISO7816_P_74: Allows multiple PACEInfo if just one parameter ID is being used.
  • ISO7816_P_75: Requires two PACEInfo elements using the same OID and different parameter IDs.
  • LDS_A_03: Now LDS version 1.8 is also accepted.
  • LDS_B_13: Added new assertions on the date (day and month).
  • LDS_D_06: Additional test step checking the LDS info object.

In the past I have missed such a list for every new released version of test specifications, like BSI TR-03105 or ICAO technical reports. You can find a list of modifiied test cases for protocol testing in the last version of BSI TR-03105 Part 3.2 in a previous post.

So I hope, this list of modified test cases is helpful for your work in context of ePassport testing. If you are interested, please leave a comment and I will update this list with every new version of test specifications in context of smart cards used in ePassports and ID cards.

Results SAC Interoperability Test in Madrid 2014

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The European Commission (EC) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has organized a SAC interoperability test in Madrid end of June 2014. The objective of this interoperability test was to assure that European countries are ready to launch Supplemental Access Control (SAC) respective PACEv2 at the end of this year. The following countries participated in the test (in alphabetical order):

  • Australia
  • Austria
  • Belgium
  • Bosnia Herzegovina
  • Czech Republic
  • Finland
  • France
  • Germany
  • Iceland
  • Italy
  • Japan
  • Netherlands
  • Norway
  • Portugal
  • Slovenia
  • Spain
  • Sweden
  • Switzerland

The SAC interoperability test was also open for industry. The following vendors participated with their ePassport solutions (in alphabetical order):

  • 3M
  • Arjowiggins
  • Athena
  • De La Rue
  • EDAPS
  • Gemalto
  • Giesecke & Devrient
  • IRIS
  • Masktech
  • Oberthur
  • PWPW
  • Safran Morpho
  • Toshiba

Every participant had the chance to submit up to two different sets of ePassport with different implementations. Altogether there were 52 samples available during the test session. All ePassports were tested in two different test procedures: Crossover Test and Conformity Test. Here the Conformity Test is focused on, because protocols are in foreground in this kind of test. There were three test labs (Keolabs, TÜViT + HJP Consulting and UL) taking part in the interoperability test with their test tools to perform a subset of “ICAO TR RF Protocol and Application Test Standard for e-Passports, Part 3”. The subset includes the following test suites:

  • ISO7816_O: Security conditions for PACE protected eMRTDs
  • ISO7816_P: Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACEv2)
  • ISO7816_Q: Command READ and SELECT for file EF.CardAccess
  • LDS_E: Matching between EF.DG14 and EF.CardAccess
  • LDS_I: Structure of EF.CardAccess

During the conformity test, all three test labs performed 21.282 test cases altogether. Nearly 3% of these test cases failed during the conformity test.

The following diagram shows the results of the conformity test as part of the SAC interoperability test. There were five samples with zero failure, seven samples with 1 failure, twenty-seven samples with 2, 3 or 4 failures, five samples with 5 up to 20 failures and eight samples with more than twenty failures:

This diagram describes the number of failures per document

The following diagram shows the failures per sample:

This diagram shows the number of failures per document

All documents supported either Integrated Mapping (IM), Generic Mapping (GM) or both. The following diagram shows the distribution of the mapping protocols:

This diagram shows the relation between Generic Mapping and Integrated Mapping

In mapping protocol there is a possibility to choose either ECDH, DH or both of them. The samples of the SAC interoperability test supported mostly ECDH, as showed in the following diagram:

This diagram shows the relation between ECDH and DH in Mapping

The observations of the conformity test (part of SAC interoperability test) are:

  • the document quality varies from “close to release state” to “experimental state”
  • there are different interpretations of padding in EF.CardAccess and EF.DG14, encoding of TerminalAuthenticationInfo in EF.DG14, the use of DO84 in PACE and the use of parameter ID when proprietary or standardized domain parameters are used
  • certificates for EAC protocol (e.g. test case 7816_O_41) were missing or not usable
  • use of different versions of test specification of test labs (Version 2.01 vs. Version 2.06)

Update 1: You can find a discussion concerning the test results on LinkedIn here.

Update 2: You can find the slides of the presentation we hold at the end of the SAC Interoperability Test here.

Interoperability Test for Supplemental Access Control (SAC)

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During the ICAO Regional Seminar on Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTD) in Madrid from 25th to 27th of June 2014 there will be also the opportunity of an interoperability test for ePassports with Supplemental Access Control (SAC). The protocol SAC is replacing Basic Access Control (BAC) used in ePassports and will be obligatory in EU from December 2014. SAC is a mechanism specified to ensure only authorized parties can wirelessly read information from the RFID chip of an ePassport. SAC is also known as PACE v2 (Password Authenticated Connection Establishment). PACE v1 is used as a basic protocol in the German ID card and was developed and specified by the German BSI.

An interoperability test is similar to a plugtest performed e.g. by ETSI. It’s an event during which devices (ePassport, inspection systems and test tools) are tested for interoperability with emerging standards by physically connecting them. This procedure allows all vendors to test their devices against other devices. Additionally, there is the opportunity besides this crossover tests to test the devices against conformity test suites implemented in test tools like GlobalTester. This procedure reduces efforts and allows comprehensive failure analyses of the devices like ePassports or inspection systems. There are well established test specifications available, both for ePassports and for inspection systems. Publishers of these test specifications are the German BSI (TR-03105) or ICAO (TR – RF and Protocol Testing Part 3).

You can find further information corresponding to this event on the ICAO website. The website will be updated frequently.

Results of SAC InterOp Test 2013 available

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The results of the InterOp test 2013 concerning the new protocol SAC (Supplemental Access Control) are available. The test event was split into two slots – a conformity test (to test if the document conform to the latest ICAO standards) and a crossover test (to test, if each document can be read by the inspection system). A concluding test report is available here. Thanks to Mark Lockie and Michael Schlüter for organizing this successful event.

ePassport Interoperability Test in London

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Next week another ePassport interoperability test takes place in London. The community will join to test their next generation smart cards in ePassports with the new protocol Supplemental Access Control (SAC) as a replacement of Basic Access Control (BAC). BAC was designed in the beginning of this century and will be replaced by SAC in December 2014 latest. The protocol SAC bases on the well known protocol Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) that was mainly developed by German BSI and that is also used in German ID cards issued since November 2010. PACE is specified in TR-03110.

During the interoperability test vendors of chips and inspections system will test their implementations against current conformity test suites of several test labs. More information can be found here: InterOp 2013.

See you in London!