Author Archives: Holger Funke

Update of BSI TR-03105 Part 5.1 available (V1.4)

Introduction

There is an update of BSI technical guideline TR-03105 Part 5.1 available. The new version 1.4 of this test specification for inspection systems with EACv1 is focusing on PACE (including PACE-CAM) and LDS 1.8.

Cover of BSI TR-03105 Part 5.1

Cover of BSI TR-03105 Part 5.1

The new version of TR-03105 is now available in new BSI layout. Additionally, there are some minor editorial changes and updated references (e.g. new Doc9303 is referenced).

New test cases in TR-03105 Part 5.1

The Standard Inspection Procedure (SIP) includes now also PACE and there is a new configuration specified for default PACE passport.

New test cases for PACE/SAC

Here is a list of new test cases, added in TR-03105 5.1 to test PACE, including PACE-CAM:

  • ISO7816_G_01: Correct execution of PACE protocols
  • ISO7816_G_02: Check supported standardized domain parameters with Generic Mapping
  • ISO7816_G_03: Check supported standardized domain parameters with Integrated Mapping
  • ISO7816_G_04: Check supported algorithms
  • ISO7816_G_05: Check PACE with additional entries in SecurityInfos
  • ISO7816_G_06: Check selection of standardized Domain Parameters and algorithms
  • ISO7816_G_07: EF.CardAccess contains two PACEInfo and PACEDomainParameter
  • ISO7816_G_08: Abort PACE because of SW error code during MSE:Set AT
  • ISO7816_G_09: Error on the nonce – Value modifications after first General Authenticate
  • ISO7816_G_10: Error on General Authenticate step 1 command
  • ISO7816_G_11: Error on General Authenticate step 1 command – bad tag (use 90h instead of 80h)
  • ISO7816_G_12: Error on General Authenticate step 2 command
  • ISO7816_G_13: Error on General Authenticate step 2 command bad tag (use 92h instead of 82h)
  • ISO7816_G_14: Abort PACE because of error in GA step 2 (GM)
  • ISO7816_G_15: Abort PACE because of error in GA step 2 (IM)
  • ISO7816_G_16: Error in General Authenticate step 2 command – error on mapping data – all ECDH public key components
  • ISO7816_G_17: Error in General Authenticate step 2 command – error on mapping data – all DH public key components
  • ISO7816_G_18: Error in General Authenticate step 3 command
  • ISO7816_G_19: Error in General Authenticate step 3 command – bad tag (use 94h instead of 84h)
  • ISO7816_G_20: Abort PACE because of error in GA step 3
  • ISO7816_G_21: Error on General Authenticate step 3 command – error on ephemeral public key – all ECDH public key components
  • ISO7816_G_22: Error on General Authenticate step 3 command – error on ephemeral public key – all DH public key components
  • ISO7816_G_23: Abort PACE because of identical ephemeral public keys
  • ISO7816_G_24: Error on General Authenticate step 4 command
  • ISO7816_G_25: Error on General Authenticate step 4 command – bad tag (use 96h instead of 86h)
  • ISO7816_G_26: Abort PACE because of error in GA step 4
  • ISO7816_G_27: Abort PACE because of TLV error on EF.CardAccess
  • ISO7816_G_28: Abort PACE because of incorrect parameterId in PACEInfo
  • ISO7816_G_29: PACE-CAM with missing tag 8Ah but correct ECAD
  • ISO7816_G_30: PACE-CAM with incorrectly encoded tag ECAD (no octet string)
  • ISO7816_G_31: PACE-CAM with wrong tag ECAD
  • ISO7816_G_32: PACE-CAM with wrong tag 8Ah (use 8Bh) but correct ECAD
  • ISO7816_G_33: PACE-CAM with correct tag 8Ah but missing ECAD
  • ISO7816_G_34: PACE-CAM with Passive Authentication
  • ISO7816_G_35: Return additional tag 8Ah during PACE-GM
  • ISO7816_G_36: Use invalid OID for PACE-CAM in EF.CardAccess
  • ISO7816_G_37: Use EF.CardAccess with PACEInfo only for PACE-CAM (no GM or IM)
  • ISO7816_G_38: Use DG14 without SecurityInfo during PACE-CAM
  • ISO7816_G_39: Use EF.CardSecurity with wrong ChipAuthenticationPublicKeyInfo during PACE-CAM
  • ISO7816_G_40: Use EF.CardSecurity without ChipAuthenticationPublicKeyInfo during PACE-CAM
  • ISO7816_G_41: Check supported standardized domain parameters with Chip Authentication Mapping

New test cases for LDS 1.8

Here is a list of new test cases, added in TR-03105 5.1 to test LDS 1.8:

  • LDS_A_10: EF.COM with LDS Version 1.8
  • LDS_H_86: EF.SOD with LDS Version 1.8
  • LDS_H_87: Security Object with LDS Version 1.8 but with wrong version number
  • LDS_H_88: Security Object with LDS Version 1.7 but version number 1
  • LDS_H_89: EF.SOD with future LDS Version 1.9

Adapted test cases in TR-03105

Here is a list of modified test cases in TR-03105 5.1:

  • In chapter 7.1.2 the OIDs for plain signatures are corrected.
  • ISO7816_D_06: Added second public key with key reference FE in EF.DG14
  • ISO7816_D_15: Use configuration of D_06 to assure the use of wrong key reference
  • ISO7816_F_02: Added signature algorithm (ECDSA with SHA1) in EF.DG14 to fulfil requirements
  • ISO7816_F_08: Changed expected results in transfer interface: TA and CA might not be performed
  • LDS_A_06: Correction in EF.COM where Unicode Version 5 must be encoded
  • LDS_D_08: The referenced invalid format owner (0102) is used by JTC1/SC27 IT Security Techniques (see www.ibia.org/base/cbeff/biometric_org.phpx). So the referenced invalid format owner was changed to ’87 02 01 FF’.
  • LDS_E_07: The referenced invalid format owner (0102) is used by JTC1/SC27 IT Security Techniques (see www.ibia.org/base/cbeff/_biometric_org.phpx). So the referenced invalid format owner was changed to ’87 02 01 FF’.
  • LDS_H_04: Correction in EF.SOD where RSASSA-PKCS1_v15 must be used
  • LDS_H_50: The serial number is mandatory, so expected result was changed to “FAIL”

Next steps

The version 1.4 of BSI TR-03105 Part 5.1 is a backport of ISO18745-4. Until the ISO test specification is under construction and not released, TR-03105 can be used as an interims version for testing inspection systems using PACE/SAC.

 

EnOceanSpy as Java version available

In 2013 I’ve released a small tool called EnOceanSpy on github. This tool can be used on a Raspberry Pi (RasPi) to log all incoming EnOcean telegrams and was implemented in C. The following photography describes the composition of Raspberry Pi, EnOcean USB300 stick (and a WakaWaka as a portable power bank):

Raspberry Pi with EnOcean USB300

Raspberry Pi with EnOcean USB300

The post at that time described the usage of this composition.

Now I’ve release a Java implementation of EnOceanSpy also on github: https://github.com/hfunke/org.protocolbench.enoceanspy. This tool logs all incoming EnOcean telegrams as well, but this time in Java. You can set the used <com port name at> the command line and EnOceanSpy logs all incoming telegrams.

And here is a Java code snippet where you can find a way to connect the USB300 stick with RXTX:

    void connect(String portName) throws Exception {
        CommPortIdentifier portIdentifier = CommPortIdentifier
                .getPortIdentifier(portName);
        if (portIdentifier.isCurrentlyOwned()) {
            System.err.println("Port is currently in use!");
        } else {
            CommPort commPort = portIdentifier.open(this.getClass().getName(),
                    3000);

            if (commPort instanceof SerialPort) {
                serialPort = (SerialPort) commPort;

                // settings for EnOcean:
                serialPort.setSerialPortParams(57600, SerialPort.DATABITS_8,
                        SerialPort.STOPBITS_1, SerialPort.PARITY_NONE);

                InputStream in = serialPort.getInputStream();
            
                serialPort.addEventListener(new SerialReader(in));
                serialPort.notifyOnDataAvailable(true);
                
            } else {
                System.err.println("Only serial ports are handled!");
            }
        }
    }

EnOcean allows on the one hand one-way and on the other hand bidirectional communication between devices. Currently most of this communication is not decrypted, so you can read all information communicated via air. There is a first specification to use cryptography for EnOcean protocol. I will give you an overview on this way of encryption in the next time.

Have fun to seek your environment after EnOcean devices :)

 

Mapping between protocols and test specifications

Introduction

This posting describes the current relation between test specifications and the protocols used in context of ePassports (eMRTD) and eID cards including their associated readers (terminals) and inspection systems.

This mapping reflects the current(!) status quo of protocols and their test specifications. All these specifications are in intensive editing at present.

Mapping between protocols and test specifications

The following image represents the mapping between protocols and the corresponding test specifications:

Mapping between protocols and test specifications

Mapping between protocols and test specifications in context of eID

You can see all protocols used currently in context of ePassports and eID cards in the rows and in the columns you can find specifications focusing on testing these protocols. For example you can find the test cases for Active Authentcation in the specification ICAO TR Protocol Testing Part 3 for chips and in BSI TR-03105 Part 5.1 for inspection systems.

As soon as there are updates available I will present here in this blog the new structure of these test specifications, including new protocols like Pseudonymous Signatures (PS), Chip Authentication Version 3 (CAv3) or Enhanced Role Authentication (ERA).

Abbreviation of protocols referred here

BAC: Basic Access Control
AA: Active Authentication
PACE: Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
SAC: Supplemental Access Control
CA: Chip Authentication
TA: Terminal Authentication
EAC: Extended Access Control
RI: Restricted Identification
eSign: electronic Signature

Test Specifications referred here

Short Name Title
TR-03105 3.1 BSI Test plan for eMRTD Application Protocol and Logical Data Structure
TR-03105 3.2 BSI Test plan for eMRTDs with EACv1
TR-03105 3.3 BSI Test plan for eID-Cards with Advanced Security Mechanisms EAC 2.0
TR-03105 3.4 BSI Test plan for eID-cards with eSign-application acc. to BSI TR-03117
TR – RF and Protocol Testing Part 3 ICAO TR – RF and Protocol Testing Part 3
TR-03105 5.1 BSI Test plan for ICAO compliant Inspection Systems with EAC
TR-03105 5.2 BSI Test plan for eID and eSign compliant eCard reader systems with EACv2

Update (30.11.2015)

Once again, you can find some discussions concerning this posting at LinkedIn.

ICAO LDS 1.8 or How to detect a file on an ePassport

Currently in context of ePassports ICAO LDS 2.0 is a hot topic. Today I would like to tell you some interesting details about an interim version, called LDS 1.8. The Logical Data Structure (LDS) specifies the way to store and protect data on ePassports (eMRTDs). Especially in the context of ePassports, this specification is required for global interoperability. Current eMRTDs are using ICAO LDS 1.7 to organise and store the data. This post describes ICAO LDS 1.8, the difference to LDS 1.7 and the motivation to use this new data structure.

Summary of eMRTD File Structure (ICAO LDS)

Summary of File Structure (Source: Doc 9303 Part 10)

The specification Doc 9303 Part 10 (‘Logical Data Structure (LDS) for Storage of Biometrics and Other Data in the Contactless Integrated Circuit (IC)’) describes all data groups and elementary files used in context of ePassports. The file EF.COM is a kind of directory where all data groups are listed. Additionally, there is a version number encoded that represents the version number of the local data structure and a Unicode Version that is used (typically 4.0.0).

So with the ‘directory’ of the ePassport, an inspection system should be able to read all relevant files of the chip. The procedure to read the information is explained in a previous posting. But addressing the files via EF.COM is risky because EF.COM cannot be trusted. EF.COM is not hashed and not signed and cannot be verified during Passive Authentication. This implies EF.COM can be manipulated easily and the manipulation in turn can be hidden easily. This way an attacker can downgrade a secure chip e.g. with Extended Access Control (EAC) to a simple chip with Basic Access Control (BAC) only by deleting the files in EF.COM. In other words, this way to detect a file on an ePassport is insecure and should be avoided.

By using the command SELECT FILE, one can also detect a file. With this command you can try to select a file in the file system of the chip and if the chip responds positively you might be sure that this file is available. This way involves the problem that some system integrators personalise the chip with empty data groups. So the chip responds positively to a SELECT FILE command, but the file does not really exist. To put it in a nutshell, this way is not sufficient either.

With ICAO LDS 1.8 all information stored in EF.COM has been duplicated now in file EF.SOD. This means that the EF.COM is deprecated and can be removed from the ePassport with the next LDS version after V1.8. By doing this a file can be detected by reading EF.SOD in a secure way. Without the file EF.COM the ePassport will be even more secure.

The following code shows the extension in EF.SOD Version 1.8:

LDSSecurityObject ::= SEQUENCE {
  version LDSSecurityObjectVersion,
   hashAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
   dataGroupHashValues SEQUENCE SIZE (2..ub-DataGroups) OF 
       DataGroupHash
   ldsVersionInfo LDSVersionInfo OPTIONAL
   -- If present, version MUST be V1 }

LDSVersionInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
   ldsVersion PRINTABLE STRING
   unicodeVersion PRINTABLE STRING }

 

From a testing perspective a new logical data structure means some more tests. The ICAO test specification for ePassports is already prepared for the data structure, e.g. test suite LDS_D includes some tests for LDS 1.8, whereas the tests for inspection systems are currently missing.

Conclusion: With ICAO LDS 1.8 you can use a way to describe the content of your ePassport in a secure way. This way the insecure file EF.COM can be omitted in the future and the inspection procedure can use secure EF.SOD to get information about the stored data groups.

Update: You can find a discussion concerning LDS 1.8 on LinkedIn here.

Update of RF and Protocol Testing Part 3 V2.07 online

There is an maintenance update of ICAO’s test specification ‘RF and Protocol Testing Part 3‘ available since today. The specification is focusing on conformity testing and protocol testing for ePassports implementing protocols like BAC and Supplemental Access Control (SAC) respective PACE v2.

The Technical Advisory Group (TAG) of ICAO endorsed the release on the ICAO website, so from now on the test specification can be referenced officially. In version 2.07 of the test specification there are no technical or fundamental changes, but editorial changes. The following test cases are modified in the new release 2.07:

  • ISO7816_B_16: Profile corrected
  • ISO7816_B_26: Added version
  • ISO7816_B_34: Profile corrected
  • ISO7816_B_52: Profile corrected
  • ISO7816_D_06: Updated version
  • ISO7816_D_09 – ISO7816_D_22: Profile corrected and version updated
  • ISO7816_E_09 – ISO7816_E_22: Profile corrected and version updated
  • ISO7816_F_20: Profile corrected and version updated
  • ISO7816_G_20: Profile corrected and version updated
  • ISO7816_O_12: Deleted obsolete Test-ID
  • ISO7816_O_13: Corrected sequence tags
  • ISO7816_O_31: Deleted obsolete Test-ID
  • ISO7816_O_35: Added missing caption
  • ISO7816_P_xx:  Deleted sample in description of step 1 (‘i.e. more than one set of
    domain parameters are available for PACE’)
  • ISO7816_P_04: Corrected numbering in expected results
  • ISO7816_P_06: Corrected numbering in expected results
  • ISO7816_P_07: Corrected numbering in expected results
  • ISO7816_P_14: Updated version
  • ISO7816_P_74: In preconditions step 3 concretized concerning PACEInfos in EF.CardAccess
  • ISO7816_Q_03: Added missing reference TR-SAC
  • LDS_D_06: Corrected typos in step 8

 

With the new edition of Doc 9303 several technical reports are now obsolete except the test specifications. These test specifications are still independent documents.

Update of ICAO Doc 9303 Edition

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has released the seventh edition of ICAO Doc 9303. This document is the de-facto standard for machine readable travel documents (MRTD). It specifies passports and visas starting with the dimensions of the travel document and ending with the specification of protocols used by the chip integrated in travel documents.

ICAO Doc 9303 Title page

A fundamental problem of the old sixth edition of Doc 9303 (released 2006) resides in the fact, that there are in sum 14 supplemental documents. All of these supplements include clarifications and corrections of Doc 9303, e.g. Supplement 14 contains 253 different issues. Additionally, there are separate documents specifying new protocols like Supplemental Access Control (SAC) also known as PACE v2. So ICAO started in 2011 to re-structure the specifications with the result that all these technical reports, guidelines and supplements are now consolidated in the seventh edition of ICAO Doc 9303. Also several inconsistencies of the documents are resolved. On this way several technical reports, like TR – Supplemental Access Control for MRTDs V1.1 and TR LDS and PKI Maintenance V2.0, are obsolete now with the seventh edition of Doc 9303.

The new edition of ICAO Doc 9303 consists now of twelve parts:

  • Part 3: Specifications common to all MRTDs
  • Part 4: Specifications for Machine Readable Passports (MRPs) and other td3 size MRTDs
  • Part 5: Specifications for td1 size Machine Readable Official Travel Documents (MROTDs)
  • Part 8: RFU (Reserved for future use): Emergency Travel Documents
  • Part 9: Deployment of biometric identification and electronic storage of data in eMRTDs
  • Part 10: Logical Data Structure (LDS) for storage of biometrics and other data in the contactless integrated circuit (IC)
  • Part 11: Security mechanisms for MRTDs
  • Part 12: Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for MRTDs

From a protocol point of view there are two interesting parts in Doc 9303: part 10 describes the data structures used in a smart card to store information. In addition part 11 describes the technical protocols to get access to this data, e.g. Chip Authentication Mapping.

Special thanks to Garleen Tomney-McGann working at ICAO headquarter in Montreal. As a member of the Traveller Identification Programme (TRIP) she has coordinated all the activities resulting in the seventh release of ICAO Doc 9303.

Chip Authentication Mapping

Supplemental Access Control (SAC) is a set of security protocols published by ICAO to protect personal data stored in electronic travel documents like ePassports and ID cards. One protocol of SAC is the well known Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) protocol, which supplements and enhances Basic Access Control (BAC). PACE was developed originally by the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) to provide a cryptographic protocol for the German ID card (Personalausweis).

Currently PACE supports three different kinds of mapping as part of the security protocol execution:

  • Generic Mapping (GM) based on a Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement,
  • Integrated Mapping (IM) based on a direct mapping of a field element to the cryptographic group,
  • Chip Authentication Mapping (CAM) extends Generic Mapping and integrates Chip Authentication.

Since Version 1.1 of ICAO technical report TR – Supplemental Access Control for MRTDs there is a specification of a third mapping procedure for PACE, the Chip Authentication Mapping (CAM), which extends established Generic Mapping. This third mapping protocol combines PACE and Chip Authentication into only one protocol PACE-CAM. On this way it is possible to perform Chip Authentication Mapping faster than both separate protocols.

The chip indicates the support of Chip Authentication Mapping by the presence of a corresponding PACEInfo structure in the file EF.CardAccess.  The Object Identifier (OID) defines the cryptographic parameters that must be used during the mapping. CAM supports AES with key length of 128, 192 and 256. But in contrast to GM and IM there is no support of 3DES (for security reasons) and only support of ECDH.

The mapping phase of the CAM itself is 100% identical to the mapping phase of GM. The ephemeral public keys are encoded as elliptic curve points.

To perform PACE a chain of GENERAL AUTHENTICATE commands is used. For CAM there is a deviation in step 4 when Mutual Authentication is performed. In this step the terminal sends the authentication token of the terminal (tag 0x85) and expects the authentication token of the chip (tag 0x86). Additionally, in CAM the chip sends also encrypted chip authentication data with tag 0x8A to the terminal.

If GENERAL AUTHENTICATION procedure was performed successfully, the terminal must perform the following two steps to authenticate the chip:

  1. Read and verify EF.CardSecurity,
  2. Use the public key of EF.CardSecurity in combination with the mapping data and the encrypted chip authentication data received during CAM to authenticate the chip.

It is necessary to perform Passive Authentication in combination with Chip Authentication Mapping to consider that the chip is genuine.

The benefit of Chip Authentication Mapping is the combination of PACE and Chip Authentication. The combination of both protocols saves time and allows a faster performance than the execution of both protocol separately.

You can find interesting information concerning CAM in the patent of Dr. Dennis Kügler and Dr. Jens Bender in the corresponding document of the German Patent and Trademark Office.

 

Java Sample Code to access Smart Card

This Java sample code describes the Java Smart Card I/O API used to get access to a common smart card. It demonstrates the communication with smart cards using APDUs specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4. It thereby allows Java applications to interact with applications running on the smart card.

The Application Programming Interface (API) for the Java Card technology defines the communication protocol conventions by which an application accesses the Java Card Runtime Environment and native services. To assure interoperability, the Java Card API is compatible with formal international standards, such as ISO/IEC 7816, and industry-specific standards, such as EMVCo’s EMV standards for payment, and ESI/3GPP standards for UICC/SIM cards.

In this Java sample code the command GET CHALLENGE is used to demonstrate a simple command sent to smart card. At the beginning of the communication protocol all registered card readers (terminals) are listed and the first one is selected to get connected with the smart card. Once the connection is established the command GET CHALLENGE is sent to the card and a random sequence of 8 bytes is returned as response.

And here is the code snippet of this sample:

// Show the list of all available card readers:
TerminalFactory factory = TerminalFactory.getDefault();
List<CardTerminal> terminals = factory.terminals().list();
System.out.println("Reader: " + terminals);
// Use the first card reader:
CardTerminal terminal = terminals.get(0);
// Establish a connection with the card:
Card card = terminal.connect("*");
System.out.println("Card: " + card);
CardChannel channel = card.getBasicChannel();
ResponseAPDU r = channel.transmit(new CommandAPDU(0x00, 0x84, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08));
String hex = DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(r.getBytes());
System.out.println("Response: " + hex);
// disconnect card:
card.disconnect(false);

If you want to use this sample in your IDE, e.g. Eclipse, keep in mind that you must access the Java Card API in a manually way. In Eclipse you can do this in project properties. Add the following access rule to the java build path: javax/smartcardio/** This allows you do access additional methods for smart cards in Java. You can find this adjustment in the following screenshot (Eclipse):

Eclipse_Properties_JavaCard

Eclipse – Project properties to access Java Card API for Java code sample

 

 

Testing ePassport Readers using TTCN-3

Currently you can find the well-known test tool Titan under the patronage of the Eclipse Foundation (proposal). This tool was developed by Ericsson several years ago to the test internet protocol (IP). Titan bases on TTCN-3, a test language focusing on communication protocols. This keeps me in mind an old project with ETSI where we used TTCN-3 to test ePassport readers concerning BSI TR-3105 part 5.1.

From end of 2009 to middle of 2011 ETSI has conducted a project to develop a test system prototype for conformance testing of ePassport readers. The objective of this project was to design, build and test a TTCN-3 (Testing and Test Control Notation, Version 3) based test system prototype for ePassport reader conformance testing. This project was a joint effort between the European Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra (Italy) and ETSI in Sophia Antipolis (France). The test language TTCN-3 has already been widely used in many testing projects across different protocols and technologies. However, until this project TTCN-3 has not been applied in the area of contactless smart card testing.

The ETSI Specialists Task Force (STF) 400 with experts from the companies / organisations AMB Consulting, ARH, Comprion, ETSI, FSCOM, HJP Consulting, Masaryk University, Soliatis and Testing Technologies operated this project. The work of this STF has been split into three main phases:

  1. Design, implementation, and use of ePassport test system
  2. Development of ePassport testing framework
  3. Writing of the documentation and dissemination material

Scope of this project was to build a test system to test an inspection system typically used to read ePassports. To demonstrate the basic functionality and the feasibility, a subset of BSI TR-03105 Part 5.1 was specified and implemented in the test system.

The following image describes the architecture of the ePassport reader test system developed during this project:

System architecture of prototype to test ePassport Reader with TTCN-3

Architecture of test system based on TTCN-3 for ePassport readers (Source: ETSI White Paper No.7)

The most significant part in the architecture is “TTCN-3 Test Component”. This module simulates the ePassort behaviour  by receiving APDUs, react to these commands and send result in APDUs back to the SUT (here the ePassport reader).

The successful implementation of a TTCN-3 based test system shows that the use of TTCN-3 fits the requirements of conformance testing of eMRTD or other eID systems. The prototype demonstrates the feasibility of using such formal techniques for protocols which would improve the quality and repeatability of tests and reduce room for interpretation.

An overview of this project and the results were summarized by the colleagues Jean-Marc Chareau, Laurent Velez and Zdenek Riha in ETSI White Paper No 7.

 

 

Update of RF and Protocol Testing Part 3 V2.06 online

The MRTD group of ICAO has released an update (version 2.06) with clarifications of their technical report RF and Protocol Testing Part 3 focusing on conformity test and protocol testing for ePassports implementing protocols like BAC and Supplemetal Access Control (SAC) respective PACEv1.

The new version 2.06 of TR-03105 Part 3.2 focusing on protocol testing includes the following changes:

  • General: Several test cases accept now additionally also an Execution Error in expected results.
  • General: Instead of ePassports we are talking now about eMRTD.
  • General: An additional profile was added: “EAC or PACE or AA-ECDSA”.
  • General: The profiles of several test cases were extended.
  • General: Compatibility to both PACE and BAC in most test cases of ISO_D and ISO_E.
  • General: Use CAR from DV certificate during Terminal Authentication instead of reading CAR from file EF.CVCA.
  • ISO7816_C_04: The command GET CHALLENGE must not have been performed.
  • ISO7816_P_10: This test case was deleted.
  • ISO7816_P_73: Allows multiple PACEInfo if just one parameter ID is being used.
  • ISO7816_P_74: Allows multiple PACEInfo if just one parameter ID is being used.
  • ISO7816_P_75: Requires two PACEInfo elements using the same OID and different parameter IDs.
  • LDS_A_03: Now LDS version 1.8 is also accepted.
  • LDS_B_13: Added new assertions on the date (day and month).
  • LDS_D_06: Additional test step checking the LDS info object.

In the past I have missed such a list for every new released version of test specifications, like BSI TR-03105 or ICAO technical reports. You can find a list of modifiied test cases for protocol testing in the last version of BSI TR-03105 Part 3.2 in a previous post.

So I hope, this list of modified test cases is helpful for your work in context of ePassport testing. If you are interested, please leave a comment and I will update this list with every new version of test specifications in context of smart cards used in ePassports and ID cards.

Results SAC Interoperability Test in Madrid 2014

The European Commission (EC) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has organized a SAC interoperability test in Madrid end of June 2014. The objective of this interoperability test was to assure that European countries are ready to launch Supplemental Access Control (SAC) respective PACEv2 at the end of this year. The following countries participated in the test (in alphabetical order):

  • Australia
  • Austria
  • Belgium
  • Bosnia Herzegovina
  • Czech Republic
  • Finland
  • France
  • Germany
  • Iceland
  • Italy
  • Japan
  • Netherlands
  • Norway
  • Portugal
  • Slovenia
  • Spain
  • Sweden
  • Switzerland

The SAC interoperability test was also open for industry. The following vendors participated with their ePassport solutions (in alphabetical order):

  • 3M
  • Arjowiggins
  • Athena
  • De La Rue
  • EDAPS
  • Gemalto
  • Giesecke & Devrient
  • IRIS
  • Masktech
  • Oberthur
  • PWPW
  • Safran Morpho
  • Toshiba

Every participant had the chance to submit up to two different sets of ePassport with different implementations. Altogether there were 52 samples available during the test session. All ePassports were tested in two different test procedures: Crossover Test and Conformity Test. Here the Conformity Test is focused on, because protocols are in foreground in this kind of test. There were three test labs (Keolabs, TÜViT + HJP Consulting and UL) taking part in the interoperability test with their test tools to perform a subset of “ICAO TR RF Protocol and Application Test Standard for e-Passports, Part 3”. The subset includes the following test suites:

  • ISO7816_O: Security conditions for PACE protected eMRTDs
  • ISO7816_P: Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACEv2)
  • ISO7816_Q: Command READ and SELECT for file EF.CardAccess
  • LDS_E: Matching between EF.DG14 and EF.CardAccess
  • LDS_I: Structure of EF.CardAccess

During the conformity test, all three test labs performed 21.282 test cases altogether. Nearly 3% of these test cases failed during the conformity test.

The following diagram shows the results of the conformity test as part of the SAC interoperability test. There were five samples with zero failure, seven samples with 1 failure, twenty-seven samples with 2, 3 or 4 failures, five samples with 5 up to 20 failures and eight samples with more than twenty failures:

This diagram describes the number of failures per document

The following diagram shows the failures per sample:

This diagram shows the number of failures per document

All documents supported either Integrated Mapping (IM), Generic Mapping (GM) or both. The following diagram shows the distribution of the mapping protocols:

This diagram shows the relation between Generic Mapping and Integrated Mapping

In mapping protocol there is a possibility to choose either ECDH, DH or both of them. The samples of the SAC interoperability test supported mostly ECDH, as showed in the following diagram:

This diagram shows the relation between ECDH and DH in Mapping

The observations of the conformity test (part of SAC interoperability test) are:

  • the document quality varies from “close to release state” to “experimental state”
  • there are different interpretations of padding in EF.CardAccess and EF.DG14, encoding of TerminalAuthenticationInfo in EF.DG14, the use of DO84 in PACE and the use of parameter ID when proprietary or standardized domain parameters are used
  • certificates for EAC protocol (e.g. test case 7816_O_41) were missing or not usable
  • use of different versions of test specification of test labs (Version 2.01 vs. Version 2.06)

Update 1: You can find a discussion concerning the test results on LinkedIn here.

Update 2: You can find the slides of the presentation we hold at the end of the SAC Interoperability Test here.

Update of BSI TR-03105 Part 3.2 available (V1.4.1)

The German BSI and French AFNOR have released an update with minor clarifications of their technical guideline BSI TR-03105 Part 3.2 focusing on conformity tests for ePassports implementing protocols like PACE and SAC (EACv1).

The new version 1.4.1of TR-03105 Part 3.2 includes changes in the following test cases:

  • ISO7816_II_2: The missing profile ‘ECDH’ is added to the profile of this test case according to the corresponding test case ISO7816_I_2 in test suite I.
  • ISO7816_II_3: There is a new test step added (step 3) to perform the additional command GENERAL AUTHENTICATE to perform key agreement correctly.
  • ISO7816_K_19: There are several meanings how to handle the ‘presence’ of a data group. A simple command SELECT to detect a data group of the chip is insufficient and may cause problems. In this test case the presence of data group EF.DG15 should be used as an indicator to perform Active Authentication. In the new version of this test case the wording is adapted to TR-03110 and is changed from “is present” to “if available”. On this way the discussion is moved from TR-03105 to TR-03110. From my point of view it makes sense to check if the relevant data group is listed in file EF.SOD. The information in EF.COM is note secured by Passive Authentication and may be corrupted. Instead of that, EF.SOD is secure and can be used as an indicator of the existence of a file on the chip.
  • ISO7816_L_13: In step 9 of this test case the command MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE is performed. In the old version of the specification this command was not complete. The missing Le byte is now added, so the command expects now 40 bytes (or 28 in hex) as response.
  • ISO7816_L_14: In the previous version of TR-03105 in step 8 of this test case a SELECT MF with parameter P2 = ‘0C’ is performed. ISO7816-4 specifies for bytes b4=1 and b3 =1 that no response data is expected if Le field is absent. This command causes problems on some COS implementations and so the command is replaced by a SELECT with P2 = ’00’ and Le = ’00’.

In the past I have missed such a list for every new released version of test specifications, like BSI TR-03105 or ICAO technical reports. So I hope, this list of modified test cases is helpful for your work in context of ePassport testing. If you are interested, please leave a comment and I will update this list with every new version of test specifications in context of smart cards used in ePassports and ID cards.